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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The agency started this case by formal adjudicative proceeding under the Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act. They heard it under Title 63, Chapter 46b, and reviewed it 
under §63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12. The agency action is ready for review and this court 
has jurisdiction under §63-46b-16(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues in this case arise out of a cease and desist order based on alleged 
requirement to register a subdivision. Numerous procedural roadblocks have prevented 
the registration. Subdivider's objections to the propriety of the roadblocks have been 
raised at each level of administrative procedure. The area of dispute has been narrowed 
but the problem remains. 
A. Issue: Whether the order is valid if it is not supported by the statutes cited. 
Standard of Review: In Savage Indus.v Utah State Tax. 811 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1991), the agency's interpretation of the statutes was reversed by the supreme court 
on a correction of error standard of review. The same standard should apply in this case 
relative to the Division's contention that the Land Sales Practices Act applies to Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos Subdivision. This issue is preserved in the record (R.364). 
B: Issue: Whether or not the Agency has authority to reconstruct the 
exemption language of §57-1 l-4(l)(f) in such a way as to increase the subdivider's burden 
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under the statute. Standard of Review: In Bonneville v. State Tax Commission, 858 
P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1983), the court says "Because we find no explicit or implied grant of 
discretion in section 59-12-104(15), we will review the Commission's interpretation under 
a correction of error standard." In the present case, there being no grant of discretion in 
regard to §57-1 l-4(l)(f), this court can review this issue under a correction of error 
standard (Ferriera's Exhibits 9 & 10, R. 337-338). 
C: Issue: Whether the agency can rely on a change of wording in the statute 
to override prior approvals obtained under Title 17 . This issue is preserved in 
Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 & 10. 
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed by the correction-of-error 
standard as in Chevron v State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1983) where the 
court states in its standard of review that, "We do not defer to an agency's statutory 
interpretation unless the legislature has explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency 
discretion to interpret the statutory language at issue." (Emphasis added.) This issue is 
preserved in Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 & 10. 
D: Issue: Whether it is lawful for an Administrative Law Judge and The 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce to issue final orders based on 
illusionary definition of a statutory term. A question of correctness exists as well as a 
question of the right to interpret statutes in absence of a legislative grant of discretion. 
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Standard of Review: A similar question was addressed in Mor-Flo v Board of 
Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1991) when the Commission assumed an expertise in 
boiler construction which it did not possess. The Mor-Flo case was decided on a 
correction of error standard with no deference to the agency. The same standard should 
be applied in this case. This issue is preserved in a general challenge of Division and the 
Department of Commerce. 
E. Issue: Whether the cease and desist order could be made permanent 
without a hearing if the Ferrieras were stopped from contesting the order by failure of the 
Division to state a cause of action or by the Division stating a false cause of action. In 
First Federal v Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), the court could grant relief under 
64-46b-16(a) on grounds that the order on which the agency action is based is 
unconstitutional as applied because the act of contesting it would be self incriminating. 
Standard of Review: A correction-of-error standard of review could be used as it 
was in Stewart v Utah Public Service, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), where the court found 
UCA 54-4-4.1(2) unconstitutional. Issue is preserved at R. 366. 
F: Issue: Whether it was lawful for the Division to start Adjudicative 
procedure against the Ferrieras while falsely claiming authority for the process under 
§57-11-13 and concealing the fact that they where proceeding under shelter of a different 
statute. Issue preserved at R. 506. 
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Standard of Review: This court may grant relief under §63-46b-16(4) using a 
correction of error standard of review as in Velarde v Board of Review. 831 P.2d 123 (Ct. 
App. 1983) where the court concluded that "in denying Mrs. Velarde her death benefits 
action and providing her no alternative remedy, without avoiding a clear social or 
economic evil, Utah Code Ann. 35-2-13(b)(3) violates article 1, section 11 of the Utah 
Code and is invalid". This issue is preserved (R. 366 -376) (R. 498) (R. 504 - 511). 
G: Issue: Whether the Division is enabled by statutes to shelve subdivided 
application to register without giving required notices. 
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(e) by a 
correction of error standard as in Krantz v Department of Commerce 856 P.2d 369 (Ct. 
App. 1983). In the present case, the Division of Real Estate failed to give the notices 
required under § 57-11-9(1). Issue preserved (R. 593) 
H: Issue: Whether the Division had the right to withhold registration from the 
Ferrieras unless the Ferrieras would offer recision rights to every person who bought a lot 
from them within a five year period prior to their cease and desist order. 
Standard of Review: This issue can be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) by a 
reasonableness and rationality standard as in Thorup Bros, v Auditing Division, 860 P.2d 
324 (Utah 1983) Issue preserved (R. 19). 
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I: Issue: Whether the Division acted lawfully when it stopped the sale of 50 
acres a]] to one party because the Ferrieras would not offer redsioi) rights to aJl others 
who purchased from them in the five years prior in view of their actions under §63-46b-20 
and its compliance subsection (2)(a). 
Standard of Review: This issue may be reviewed under §63-46b-16(4)(d) by a 
correction of error standard as in Bevans v Industrial Comm., 790 P.2d 573 (Ct. App. 
1990) where the agency was not statutorily enabled to reduce Beven's workers 
compensation benefits. This issue is preserved (R. 22). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is caused by an assumption made by the Utah Division of Real Estate 
that the Ferrieras were selling unregistered subdivided lands in Mineral Mountain Ranchos 
Subdivision. The Ferrieras admit to selling the lots but deny that the sales were subject to 
the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 
Division of Real Estate brought this case against the Ferrieras by simultaneous 
service of Notice of Adjudicative Proceeding (R. 1) and cease and desist order (R. 3) 
claiming authority of §57-11 -13 and requiring the Ferrieras to stop seWing )ands in Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos and the state of Utah until such lands were registered with them. The 
Ferrieras submitted application to register in accordance with §57-11-5, 6, and 7 (R. 192); 
Division did not respond in accordance with §57-11-9; Judge scheduled exemption 
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hearing at the Ferrieras1 request (R. 13). The Ferrieras requested information about the 
case and were denied (R. 14); The Ferrieras filed Motion to Exclude Present Escrow and 
were denied (R. 19); A telephonic exemption hearing was held on February 24, 1997, (R. 
353 - 483). Findings, conclusions and order were issued that subdivision is not exempt 
(R. 484-494); Petition for Agency Review was filed (R. 495- 541). Request was made to 
copy records and denied (R. 605-615) Order on Review (R. 623-634) says subdivision is 
not exempt. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS 
The feasibility of Mineral Mountain Ranchos Subdivision, hereinafter called MMR, 
was studied by Bullock Bros. Engineering Inc. in April of 1983 (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, 
R. 302-306) and prepared in accordance with the Division of Health Requirements (R. 
302). The feasibility study shows that Cress Ferriera is the developer representative (R. 
304) and that it was prepared in accordance with "requirements to Establish Feasibility of 
Proposed Housing Subdivisions" as published by the Utah State Division of Health dated 
January, 1971 (R. 305). The study includes a preliminary plat, showing contours, 
proposed street and lot layouts and at R. 305 it says, "2. Individual homes in the 
subdivision will receive water from private individual wells (R. 305)"; and at the time 
MMR was approved, Ferriera had drilled one well on his property near the East 1/4 
quarter corner of Section 22, T29S. R8W SLB&M.(R. 307). The study shows that water 
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from that well was tested by Southern Utah State College in February 1983 (R. 308-10) 
(R. 113). On July 8, 1983 the approved map with official signatures was properly 
recorded (R.191). Beaver county has a mobile home ordinance (R. 339) to "protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of the present and future residents" (R. 339 Chapter 1). MMR 
specifically allows mobile homes (R. 214 d) Over the years, four mobile homes have been 
moved into MMR under building permits issued by Beaver County and the Southwest 
Utah Division of Health. (R. 343) (R. 344) (R. 349) (R. 350)(R. 404-412). 
A. Validity 
The Division issued the order and started the formal adjudicative proceedings 
"pursuant to investigation ..." (R. 3). 
This order is not supported by the Land Sales Practices Act which is being claimed 
as authority (R. 3). 
The validity issue was brought up in court at (R. 357). 
The Division tried to establish that the Ferrieras' failure to prove the exemption 
issue would constitute an automatic validation of the cease and desist order (R. 362) 
(R363. 22-24). 
The Ferrieras preserved that issue in saying they are "... in no way prepared to 
concede that it (if) the thing is not exempt that that order to cease and desist was validly 
issued." (R. 364). 
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Ferriera relied on his knowledge of the Land Sales Practices Act and a face to face 
conversation with the Division of Real Estate when he decided to bypass the registration 
process in 1986 (R. 7-8). 
According to Utah Code Ann. §57-11-21, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices 
Act "shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of 
those states which enact it". The Utah act was patterned after the Model Land Sales 
Practices Act (see addendum page marked 669). Ferreira relied on the intent and purpose 
of the Land Sales Practices (R. 378). 
The objective of the Utah version and the Model Act is "the prevention of fraud" 
Wallis v. Thomas 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
The Model Land Sales Practices Act was meant for subdivisions of more than 25 
lots (Addendum page marked 674) Model Land Sales Practices Act (1.(6)); MMR has 22 
lots (Division's Exhibit 12). 
Targets of the Land Sales Practices Act are known as promotional subdivisions 
(see comment following Model (1.(6) at page marked 675 of the addendum). Subdivisions 
selling less than 25 separate lots per year are excluded (Model (3.(2), addendum page 
marked 677). 
B. The 1983 Exemption Language 
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The items discussed face to face with the Division in 1986 (R. 9) were the 
condition of the title, the approval of the plat, and the absence of a promotional plan. 
Ferriera phoned the division immediately after being served and was switched to David 
Jones who turned the conversation away from these topics by questioning Ferriera about 
the precise location he had visited in Salt Lake City ten years before. Mr. Jones said he 
was working there at the time. After that, Mr. Jones argued the applicability of the 
statutory exemptions of the Land Sales Practices Act as they were before 1983, after 
1983, and at present time. In conclusion, he told Ferriera the Division intended to call for 
recision rights to all persons who bought lots from the Ferriera's during the 5 year period 
immediately preceding the cease and desist order. 
C. The 1993 v 1983 Exemption Language 
The present wording of the exemption at §57-ll-4(l)(f) is different from what it 
was in 1983 when MMR was approved under Title 17. The difference in the language is 
not decisive but it weighs heavily on the interpretation of the present exemption language 
of the Land Sales Practices Act. The difference between the two versions of 
§57-1 l-4(l)(f) is essential to the Ferrieras' case. 
Apparently the version cited by the Division as §57-11-1, et seq. (1993) is the 
product of 1991 legislative session. The wording seems to transfer a satisfactory 
assurance of completion from the police power of the county ordinances to the subdivider 
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(Ferrieras' Exhibits 9,10, 13, and 14). However, the transfer is arguable because the 
assurance referred in the present exemption language is probably related to the granting of 
a temporary permit under §57-11-5(2) and §57-M-7(l)(e)(iii). The alleged promise of 
completion (R. 431-432) is non existent. 
D. The 1993 Exemption Language 
This is the same issue sometimes referred to in this case as the 1993 exemption. 
The 1991 legislature changed 57-ll-4(l)(f) of the Land Sales Practices Act to make the 
exemption dependent on the subdivided furnishing of satisfactory assurance of 
completion of the improvements". That change is evident in Ch. 165 Laws of Utah 1991. 
In that chapter it is not at all clear whether the new satisfactory assurance of completion 
clause refers to a preexisting promise to complete or the one required in the public 
offering statement at §57-ll-7(l)(e)(iii). Ferriera is sure it is the latter because it does 
not make much sense the other way. However, that question needs to be answered by this 
court not the Division of Real Estate because, clearly, it is a matter of law not agency 
expertise. 
Both of §57-11-4 and §57-11-7 were modified in the same time frame in 
consecutive paragraphs of Laws of Utah, 1991 ch.165. Namely, §1 and §2. It would be 
too self serving to allow the Division to use the satisfactory assurance of completion of 
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the improvements phrase to demonstrate a non existent promise to complete by the 
subdivider. 
The Division spawned its own unique interpretation of 1991, ch. 165, §1. The 
facts about the 1993 exemption issue are plain. The Ferrieras say MMR is exempt from 
registration at §57-ll-4(l)(f). The Division and the Administrative Law Judge say the 
subdivision is not exempt because the Ferrieras have not provided "assurance of 
completion of the improvements as to culinary water" The order on review says "the 
Ferrieras agreed to supply culinary water to the lots in 1983" but did not do it and do not 
intend to do it. The Ferrieras say the subdivision has culinary water and the exemption 
language is not based on a requirement that the subdivider has to complete anything that is 
not described in the POS. 
In essence, the absence of a promise to complete made by the subdivider in a 
public offering statement, automatically exempts the subdivision if it's located in a county 
which has the facilities described in §57-ll-4(l)(f)(i) and §57-ll-4(l)(f)(ii) regardless of 
the improvements providing it will have telephone and electricity when it is complete. 
E. Constitutionality 
The cease order was based on exemption issue "which are not exempt" (R. 3). 
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The Division started formal adjudicative proceeding on the same they issued the 
cease and desist order (R. 1). Section §57-11-13 does not authorize the Division to start 
adjudicative proceedings. 
The emergency order is not in compliance with §63-46b-20(2)(b) because they did 
not state any reason for starting using emergency proceedings in the order (R. 1-3) 
Division acknowledged the validity issue by inviting the Ferrieras to "contest this 
cease and desist order" (R. 1). 
The court confirmed the existence of the validity issue by using it to deny 
Ferriera's motion to exclude a preexisting escrow (R. 357). 
The Division tried to validate the cease and desist order by insisting that if the 
subdivision were found not exempt, the order would be valid automatically (R. 363). 
Ferriera objected to automatic validation (R. 364). 
Ferriera requested information about what provoked the problem (R. 14). 
The Division resorted to a formal adjudicative proceeding so they could rely on it to 
withhold information regarding the investigation pursuant to the order (R. 17) 
(R. 606-615). 
Ferreira could not argue the validity of the order at the exemption hearing because 
he did not know why it was issued in the first place (R. 363) 
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The court tried to force Ferriera to testify on the validity of the order anyway 
which brought 12 pages of argument (R. 363-375) 
The argument was concluded by the court's allowing the Ferrieras to reserve the 
validity issue (R.376). 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Executive Director of the Department of 
Commerce have issued final orders upholding the cease and desist orders.. 
F. Due Process 
The Division issued emergency order under §63-46b-20 and claimed authority 
under §57-11-13 (R. 563) 
The order is defective because it doesn't give any reason for emergency action 
even though the statement of any reason is required at §63-46b-20(2)(b). 
They concealed that it was an emergency order until Ferreira reasoned it out 
and faced them with it (R. 507). 
Eventually, the Division admitted they had used the emergency procedures 
of§63-46b-20(R. 564). 
They asked their superior agency to disregard the due process issue (R. 561) 
They are still trying to deny due process to the Ferrieras by claiming the Ferrieras 
waived their rights (R. 562). 
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The Administrative Law Judge offered them a post judgment hearing but he 
admitted he is prejudiced by saying "This court remains convinced that the September 30, 
1996 Order was issued in full compliance with procedural requirements mandated by 
§57-11-13 (R. 107) 
G. The Registration Issue 
The Division received a fully executed and paid up application to Register the 
subdivision from the Ferriera's on October 25, 1996 (R. 605). 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1 l-9(l)(a) through §57-1 l-9(l)(c) provides: 
1) (a) Upon receipt of the application for registration in proper form, the 
division shall issue a notice of filing to the applicant within five business 
days of the date of receipt of application. 
(b) Within 30 days from the date of the notice of filing, or, if no notice of 
filing is issued within the time required, within 35 days from the date of 
receipt of the application, the division shall register the subdivided lands or 
reject the registration. 
(c) If the division has not entered the rejection within 30 days from the date 
of notice of filing, the land is considered registered unless the applicant has 
consented in writing to a delay. 
None of the above described notices have been received by the Ferrieras. 
The Division has neither granted nor denied the application (R. 487) (R. 593). 
H. Recision Rights 
The Division's letter dated December 2, 1996 makes retroactive recision rights and 
other things a prerequisite for registration (R. 40). 
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Retroactive recision rights are not a statutory requirement under 57-11-8(1). There 
is no statutory grant of discretion to the agency in this regard. 
The Division does not understand the diflference between sales contracts and real 
estate purchase contracts and the importance of that diflference to the Land Sales Practices 
Act (R. 53-54) (R. 73-74) 
I. The Right to Close Escrow 
The Ferrieras filed Motion to Exclude Present Escrow from the Cease and Desist 
Order on January 23, 1997 (R. 19-41) including exhibits and attachments intended to 
demonstrate to the court that the Ferrieras had faithfully and conscientiously fulfilled all 
statutory requirements for registration of the subdivision. 
The value of the escrow was $38,500 (R. 24) The title to be transferred was for 
three water rights and all utilities including a 25 gallon per minute well (R. 24, 1.1). Seller 
was to insure the title and convey it under the usual warranty deed subject only to a note 
and first deed of trust. The buyer was to have a seven day right of recision under the 
standard Utah REPC (R. 24). 
Section §63-46b-20(2)(a) reads as follows: 
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent 
or avoid the danger to the public health, safety, or welfare (Emphasis 
added). 
The court denied the motion based on fuzzy logic (R. 357) 
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ARGUMENT FOR THE EXEMPTION ISSUE 
The Land Sales Practices Act, being relied upon by the Utah Division of Real 
Estate does not support the Division's action against the Ferrieras. It is patterned after the 
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Land Sales Practices Act (see addendum but page 
numbers therein are not related to page numbers in the index of the record) The Land 
Sales Practices Act was known as the Utah Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practices 
Act until 1987. After that it became known as the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 
Both versions of the Act are based on the 1966 Uniform Land Sales Practices Act which 
has been adopted in substance by most of the United States. Utah was the tenth state to 
adopt it. Clearly, the Model Act is focused on the manner in which lands are sold not the 
manner in which they are subdivided. Apparently, the Division was not aware of origin 
and purpose of the Land Sales Practices Act. If they were, they should not have cited it 
against the Ferrieras because Mineral Mountain Ranchos is not a promotional subdivision. 
The Land Sales Practices Act is essential to the protection of the unskilled and 
inexperienced residential property buyer who might otherwise be taken in by the false 
promises and suede shoe sales tactics sometimes used by unscrupulous real estate 
promoters. The Division's duty under The Land Sales Practices Act is to enforce the 
production of an elaborate detailed disclosures regarding the character of the land and the 
resources of the sellers which disclosure is referred to as a public offering statement 
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(§57-11-17) or a POS (R41). Under §57-11-12 the Division is empowered to investigate 
the correctness of the POS but nothing in the Land Sales Practices Act authorizes the 
Division to evaluate the fitness or the completenessof any subdivision improvement. That 
duty is reserved unto the County officials under Title 17 as referenced at 
§57-11-6(1)0X0 
The exemption language of the Land Sales Practices Act is designed to minimize 
administrative costs by excluding the vast majority of subdivisions from its jurisdiction 
(see prefatory note in addendum). Contrary to the Division's thoughts of record expressed 
in various phrases such as "entitled to an exemption" "not deserve an exemption" and in 
the record (R. 465), the exemptions are not there to provide an escape hatch for sleazy 
developers. Mineral Mountain Ranchos, hereinafter MMR, is purposely exempt from The 
Land Sales Practices Act by, title, definition, and statutes as well as by the intent and 
purpose of the Model Act because the legislature wants to minimize administrative costs. 
DETAILS OF THE EXEMPTION ARGUMENT 
A. Validity Argument 
Respondent ordered the Ferrieras to stop selling subdivided lands in Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos until such lands are properly registered under provisions of §57-11-1, 
et seq (R4). The findings upon which the September 30, 1996 order is based state that the 
Ferrieras are "engaging in acts constituting violations of the Land Sales Practices Act". 
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The only three ways of violating this chapter are listed at §57-11-17(1 )(a), (b), and 
(c) as follows: 
(a) refers to §57-11-5 which has four subsections all pertaining to 
"subdivided lands;" 
(b) refers to untrue statements of material facts in disposing of 
"subdivided lands;" 
(c) refers to omitting a material fact in disposing of "subdivided 
lands." 
The definition of "subdivided lands" given at §57-11-2 (9) is "ten or more units 
offered as part of a common promotional plan". In the absence of a promotional plan the 
lands mentioned are not subdivided lands regardless of the number of lots involved. None 
of the land referred to in the order is identifiable as "subdivided lands" within the meaning 
of the Land Sales Practices Act because there is no promotional plan. The Ferrieras admit 
to selling lots in MMR but they deny selling "subdivided lands". Unless the Division had 
already proved that the lands being sold by the Ferrieras are subdivided lands within the 
meaning of the Land Sales Practices Act, they had no "reason to believe "that the 
above-named Respondents have been, and are, engaging in acts constituting 
violation of the Utah Land Sales Practices Act,f (R. 3). Therefore, they had no 
authority to issue a cease and order in this case. 
In their letter dated December 2, 1996 (R41. 4). The Division states that "The 
Public Offering Statement (POS) you submitted is acceptable and may be used for this 
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offering". That approved document says that MMR was not to be sold under a 
"promotion plan" so none was undertaken (R. 35) That document was approved by the 
Division of Real Estate itself (R. 41). 
The definition of "promotion" given in the New Lexicon Webster's Encyclopedic 
Dictionary, 1989, is "a striving to secure greater sales by intensive advertising". 
The Administrative Law Judge found only three lots sold on November 17, 1995 
(R.102). However there were seven sold on that date because two of the buyers wanted 
10 acre sites (two five acre lots each ) and one wanted a fifteen acre site (three five acre 
lots). 
Nevertheless, the court should wonder how the Division could believe that three 
lot sales in the entire year of 1995 could be the result of an intensive plan of advertising. 
The Ferrieras conclusion is that the Division well knew MMR is not a promotional 
subdivision and they only wanted to see how much trouble they could make for the 
Ferrieras by tying up their real estate. 
In order to cancel any possible inferences of a common promotional plan in MMR, 
we reconciled the sales or record in this proceeding to the following tabulation: 
MMR is 22 lots of 5 Acres each (Division's Exhibit 12). The record shows that during 
the five years preceding the September 30, 1996 cease and desist order, the Ferrieras sold 
1) One lot to Robert and Sharon Andrew on July 1, 1996 (Division's Exhibit 18); 
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2) Two lots to Douglas Parker November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 19; 
3) Three lots to Jon Fry on November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 20); 
4) Two lots to Steven Scandell on November 30, 1995 Division's Exhibit 21; 
5) Two lots to David Fry on November 24, 1995 Division's Exhibit 22, 
6) Two lots to Phil Ivey on May 21, 1995 Division's Exhibit 25 
7) One lot to Gayle Cooney on May 24, 1994 Division's Exhibit 24 
8) One lot to Ross Low on June 20, 1994 Division's Exhibit 26; 
During those five years there was one transaction in 1996, five transactions in 
1995 and two transactions in 1994. In all, fourteen lots were sold during those five years 
but only 8 transactions because most of the buyers preferred ten acres home sites and 
bought two lots each. Two lots had been sold before that five year period and at the time 
of the cease and desist order two other lots were in escrow leaving four lots unsold at the 
time of the order. From time of its approval in 1983 until the date of the order in 1996 
there were eleven dispositions as defined at §57-11-2(1). This can not be seen as the result 
of any common promotional plan by any stretch of the imagination The tabulation 
averages out to about one sale every 15 months. Moreover, every last sale was made to 
local people or a friend or relative of a local person. No sale was ever made from 
advertising. By definition, the Utah Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to any of the 
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lands mentioned in this case, because there is no evidence that the Ferrieras had any 
common plan of promotion. 
The Division also ordered the Ferrieras to stop offering or selling the four 40 acre 
parcels adjacent to MMR. However, these parcels are not part of a common promotional 
plan of advertising and sale. They are not subdivided lands within the meaning of the 
Land Sales Practices Act (R. 4). 
The Division ordered the Ferrieras to stop offering or selling land in this State but 
the Ferrieras have not offered or sold any land in the State of Utah under a common 
promotional plan of advertising and sale. The order does not apply to anything the 
Ferrieras have ever done with real estate. 
No single paragraph describes the Land Sales Practices Act better than the 
eleventh paragraph written by Chief Justice Maugham in Wallis v Thomas 632 P.2d 39 
which says: 
"In construing this Act, the focus should be on its objective, i.e., the 
regulation of subdivided lands was designed for the prevention of fraud and 
sharp practices in a type of real estate transaction peculiarly open to such 
abuses." 
The few lots involved in the entire subdivision, only 22 in all, the few sales made 
in MMR, and the absence of any promotional plan, exclude this tract of land from the 
kind of subdivision that is "peculiarly open to such abuses." 
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Section §57-11-21 of the Utah Land Sales Practices Act provides: 
"This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose 
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." 
As noted by Chief Justice Maugham in the Wallis v Thomas case, the Utah 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act effective August 1, 1973, with certain modifications, 
follows the Model Act. The Ferrieras realize that Utah did not include the following 
section in its codification of the Act. The purpose in citing it here is to address the 
comments following the section in the same way as Chief Justice Maughan did in Wallis v 
Thomas when he cited the comment following section (3)(1) of the Model Act 
(addendum page marked 677). The Ferrieras make the citation at this point to 
demonstrate the intent and purpose of the act not to invoke it as controlling authority. 
Subsection 3(2) of the Model Act (addendum 677) provides an exemption if 
"fewer than [25] separate parcels , units, or interests in subdivided lands are offered by a 
person in a period of [12] months;" 
The Comment that follows the exemption reads as follows: 
This exemption will exclude all locally oriented offerings and will 
allow the seller to take advantage of the exemption even though the 
subdivision may be large enough to qualify , by restricting the amount of 
land offered for disposition. In order to qualify under this exemption, the 
owner must not only refrain from selling, but must refrain from offering 
the requisite number of lots for sale. 
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It is reasonably obvious that the Utah Legislators, in revising the Land Sales 
Practices Act at Laws of Utah, 1983, ch. 255, §2, purposely incorporated the "fewer than 
[25] separate parcel" exemption into the definition language by substituting the phrase 
"including land" for the phrase "and also includes any land" in the first sentence of 
§57-11-2(9) as shown below. In this way, they were able to eliminate section 3(2) of the 
Model, maintain the full substance of The Act, and fulfill the purpose of uniformity 
expressed at §57-11-21. 1983, ch. 255, §2, Laws of Utah which reads:: 
(6) "Subdivision" and "subdivided lands" means [any]-land which is 
divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten 
or more units [and also includes any] including land^ whether contiguous 
or not j f ten or more units are offered as a part of a common promotional 
plan of advertising and sale. [Where any] If a subdivision is offered by a 
[single] developer[7] or [ft] group of developers [acting in concert], and 
[that] the land is contiguous or is known, designated, or advertised as a 
common tract or by a common name, that land [shall be] is presumed, 
without regard to the number of units covered by each individual offering, 
to be part of a common promotional plan: 
It also can be seen from the foregoing that the purpose of the authority being 
claimed by the Division (§57-11-1, et seq) is to supervise the manner in which lands 
are sold not the manner in which they are subdivided. 
The Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to MMR because 
there is no plan of promotion. 
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It should be noted that the Wallis v Thomas case took place in 1981 and the 
decision therein was based on the definition of subdivided land as it stood in 1981 not as it 
is now in 1998. As that definition stands now and has stood for the last 15 years, MMR is 
not included in the Land Sales Practices Act because it does not now have and never has 
had a common plan of promotion. 
B. The 1983 Exemption Argument 
MMR is clearly exempt at §57-ll-(4)(l)(f) as it stood in 1983 because this 
exemption simply provides that subdivided lands that are subject to county ordinances 
which assure an orderly development of the improvements are exempt from the provisions 
of the Land Sales Practices Act. The Division does not want to understand that their only 
authority under the act is to enforce and monitor the production and distribution of a 
detailed disclosure statement. Their duty is not to evaluate subdivisions Conformance to 
building standards is the responsibility of the county. Evaluation is the buyer's privilege. 
The Division agreed (R. 391) that all conditions of the 1993 exemption language 
exist in Mineral Mountain Ranchos except that it doesn't have culinary water R-104. The 
common basis of all their conclusions and final orders is that the exemption requires the 
subdivider to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the culinary water (R. 
431). The 1983 exemption language does not include the word subdivider nor does it in 
any way imply that the subdivider shall furnish satisfactory assurance of completion of 
24 
anything. The 1983 exemption language used the same words as the 1993 exemption does 
but the earlier version did not imply that subdivider is required to furnish satisfactory 
assurance of completion as demonstrated in Ferrieras' Exhibits 9 and 10. The Ferrieras' 
understanding of the 1983 language is simply that the state will not require a POS if the 
County Ordinances assure completion of the off-site improvements. MMR was designed 
in favor of Mobile Homes (R. 214, d.), Beaver County has a Mobile Home Ordinance 
(Ferrieras1 Exhibit 11, R. 339-342), and MMR is properly approved under Title 11 
(Division's Exhibit 12). 
The Division agreed that ail con&hons cS tne *Y99i exemption aie'hSiry TneViTi 
MMR except, as \o CUYKKK^  ^?i\e\ ^.^V). 'Vsresi ^J&J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ ^ s ^ ^ v ^ s ^ ^Rrsftt^st 
subdivide* pxwide tt3&\sra&&&, s£ ^ \a$feJas\. %ssw5V*&, ^sst ^ ^ ^ s ^ ^ < * s t ^ 
the subdivides UCK places *JN$ S V M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ Q^^KH^. X k ^ ^ ^ m < ^ ^ M L ^ ^ 
the 1983 statutes could can not be ojiestioaed without cefeceace ta t&& 1991 t^a£u.t£& 
which of course had not yet been conceived. 
C. The 1983 v 1993 Exemption Argument 
To establish that "no operative difference" (R. 105) exists between the two 
versions of §57-ll-4(l)(f) the division had to assume an expertise in the definition of 
culinary water and a statutory right to determine that the subdivider is responsible for 
assurance of its existence in the affected land. They do not have the expertise on water 
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and they do not have a statutory grant of discretion to determine that the subdivider is 
responsible for the assurance. 
The Ferrieras assert that the county ordinances adequately assure that no home 
will be occupied unless the owner of the home provides himself with culinary water 
service. The Division is trying to say the subdivider has to provide the culinary water 
service in order to fit the terms of the exemption language. The county was satisfied that 
culinary water was generally available throughout the subdivision when they approved it 
and they were confident that no one could live in the subdivision without either drilling his 
own well or hooking up to a neighbors well. All they wanted to know was that each lot 
owner would be provided with a water right which would authorize him to apply for a 
permit from the state engineer to drill his own well if he so desired. The ordinances make 
it clear that, without a source of culinary water, no building permit will be issued. The 
difference between the 1983 version and the 1993 versions of the exemption is an illusion 
that appears only if the present version is misread with an incorrect definition of culinary 
water in mind. Culinary water is not culinary water service. The present exemption 
language is the product of 1991 legislature. In actuality, the wording only appears to 
transfer a satisfactory assurance of completion from the police power of the county 
ordinances onto the subdivider (Ferrieras' exhibits 9, 10, ). The Division is relying on a 
false definition of culinary water to establish a necessity for the satisfactory assurance of 
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completion which they are trying to impose on the Ferrieras. If they are allowed to 
establish that culinary water and culinary water service mean the same thing , they think 
they can prove to us that there is no operative difference between the two versions of the 
exemption and thereby prove that the subdivider has always had an obligation to furnish 
satisfactory assurance of completion even in 1983, under which language, MMR 
obviously is exempt. 
In the final analysis, there being no factual evidence to show the existence of a 
promise to complete (R. 412), the satisfactory assurance of completion phrase is 
meaningless. Even though the difference is based on an incorrect definition of culinary 
water, Ferriera needs to reserve a right to rely on the 1983 version of the exemption if he 
is required to preserve the argument that the subdivision was exempt at the time it was 
approved under Title 17 in 1983. 
D. The 1993 Exemption Argument 
The agency has created an illusionary interpretation of the exemption language but 
the legislature did not grant the division any right of discretion in the interpretation of that 
statute. In Chevron v State Tax Commission. 847 P.2d 418, the court states in its standard 
of review that "We do not defer to an agency's statutory interpretation unless the 
legislature has explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency discretion to interpret the 
statutory language at issue." emphasis added. 
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In our case, the agencies illusionary interpretation was created by the following 
conclusions of the administrative law judge and the Executive Director of the Department 
of Commerce.. 
(R. 487) "failed to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements for 
culinary water" 
(R. 489) "the subdivider would be required to provide assurance of completion of those 
improvements" 
(R. 489) "the improvements ... must consist ... of a well on each lot ... or a delivery 
system. 
(R. 490) "assurance of completion of the improvements as to culinary water" 
(R. 631) "Subdivider agreed to supply culinary water to the lots" 
The code exemption calls for culinary water all right but all of the forgoing refer to 
an illusion of culinary water. Culinary water is a natural attribute of the land not an 
illusion. The Administrative Law Judge has reached other conclusions that are neither 
logical nor supported by statute. For example, he said that the subdivided efforts in 
regards to providing culinary water "cannot be reasonably construed (R. 105) to 
constitute completion of the improvements as that phrase is used in §57-ll-4(l)(f)." He 
went even further when he said "clearly the improvements in question must necessarily 
consist of either the construction of a well on each lot to actually provide culinary 
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water for that lot or the completion of a delivery system whereby water from an 
adjoining lot is available to the lot in question (R. 105) (R. 431) (R. 409). The Judge 
is describing culinary water services but that is not what the code calls for. 
The Division is arguing that culinary water service means the same thing as 
culinary water means in the exemption language (R. 396, 397). Nevertheless 
§57-ll-4(l)(f)(iii) specifically calls for "culinary water" by reference to 
§57-ll-(4)(l)(f)(ii); not culinary water service. Wherever the code means culinary 
water service, it refers to it by that specific phrase as in §57-11-4(3 )(a)(i), 
§57-ll-4(3)(a)(ii), §57-11-4(3)(b)(i), and §57-ll-6(l)(o)(i). The two phrases are not 
synonymous. Culinary water is household water that may be drawn from a river, stream, 
lake, or well, by bucket on a rope, a windmill, a gas powered pump, an electric powered 
pump, or in special instances, hauled out from town on a tank truck . Culinary water is a 
natural attribute of the land that is available to the inhabitants of the land for household 
use as long as it is accessed in a way that is approved by ordinances of the county, the 
local health department, and the state engineer. 
Culinary water service, on the other hand, means water piped to each dwelling 
from a common source in some way similar to what the judge is describing above. That 
kind of water supply must be evaluated by the Health Department (R. 413) or some 
agency other than the Division of Real Estate. 
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The difference between the terms is exemplified in Paulson v Hooper 
Water Imp. DisU 656 P.2d 459, (Utah 1982) as follows: 
"After trial, the trial court found that, even though the defendant had 
installed main culinary water lines adjacent to the area in question, the 
installation and "availability" of water is not the same as furnishing 
culinary water services to the plaintiffs' land. Thus, the court entered a 
finding that the defendant "was not, at the date of the filing of the petition, 
furnishing culinary water service to the territory sought to be withdrawn. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The §57-ll-4(l)(f) exemption being relied on by the Ferrieras is based on the 
availability (R. 401) of culinary water not culinary water service. There is no explicit 
grant of discretion in this section of the code, under which the Division of Real Estate can 
assume the expertise needed to determine that the code means culinary water service 
when it clearly says culinary water. The Division is not constituted to decide that the 
culinary water called for in §57-ll-(4)(l)(f) means that water must be piped to or 
available from a private well on each lot at the time of sale in order to declare the 
subdivision exempt. Obviously, the division is still building on its own illusion by saying, 
"the improvements in question must necessarily consist of either the construction of a well 
on each lot to actually provide culinary water for that lot or of the completion (R. 431) of 
a delivery system whereby water from an adjoining lot is available to the lot in question 
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R. 105). Under any light, the judge is clearly mistaken because the exemption language at 
§57-1 l-4(l)(f) calls for assurance of completion not completion. The existence of 
underground water was all the assurance the county needed for approval of the 
subdivision. If anything else had been required by the Beaver County Commissioners, they 
would have called for a performance bond; that they did not do (R. 432). 
Moreover, an assurance of completion is not justifiable without a promise to 
complete and none was requested or given (R. 431-432). If the subdivider is the one who 
is supposed to provide the assurance that promise would have had to come from the 
subdivider in order for it to be binding upon him. 
The court says that "that assurance would come from the subdivider" (R. 105)and 
the Department rubber stamped it by saying "subdivider obtained approval of the Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos by the planning commission based upon representations that culinary 
water would be provided by the Ferrieras at each lot in the subdivision" (R. 628). They 
issued their order of noncompliance on an alleged existence of the subdividers promise to 
complete a culinary water improvement that they perceive to be either a well on each lot in 
the subdivision or a piped water delivery system. 
The facts are: 
September 22, 1981, the Division of Water Rights recommends .45 acre Ft. 
(Ferrieras' Exhibit. 5, R. 331) per family. 
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April, 1983, Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says, "Individual homes in this 
subdivision will receive water from private individual wells" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R. 305). 
April, 1983, Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says "Private individual wells will 
serve this subdivision" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R. 305). 
April, 1983), Bullock Brothers Feasibility Study says, "Individual water wells are 
anticipated as sources of supply for each lot and a statement from the Utah State Engineer 
is attached which discusses feasibility of obtaining ground water" (Ferrieras' Exhibit 1, R. 
305). 
April 20, 1983, Preliminary plat map is approved by County Commission 
contingent on a letter from the Health Department (Division's Exhibit 1). 
April 20, 1983, County Commission motion carried to rezone from MU 10 to A-5 
(Division's Exhibit 1). 
May 10, 1983, Southwest Utah District Health Department acknowledged the 
subdivider's proposal "that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing 
property" emphasis added (Ferrieras' Exhibit 4, R. 327). 
May 10, 1983, that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing 
property" emphasis added. Feasibility statement acknowledged the subdivider's proposal 
"that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing property" (emphasis 
added) and said that such water supply is feasible (Ferrieras' Exhibit 4, R 328) 
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June 10, 1983, notice of public hearing on petition to rezone. 
(Ferrieras' Exhibit 2, R. 325). 
June 13, 1983, public hearing on petition to rezone held without protest 
(Division's Exhibit 4, R. 114). 
June 13, 1983, the zoning ordinance adopted (Ferrieras' Exhibit 3, R. 326). 
June 15, 1983, Planning Commission required .73 Acre Ft for each 5 acres in 
stead of the proposed .45 and Ferriera cut down the number of lots to 25 so he would 
have enough water for the whole subdivision (Ferrieras' Exhibit 6, R. 332). 
July 6, 1983, revised map of MMR presented and accepted by the planning 
commission (Division's Exhibit 3). 
July 7, 1983, revised map of MMR presented and accepted by the County 
Commissioners (Division's Exhibit 5). 
July 8, 1983, approved map of the subdivision is recorded (Division's Exhibit 12). 
The foregoing being all the evidence of contacts between the Beaver County 
Officials and the Ferrieras prior to and including final approval and recording of the plat 
map, and there being substantial and credible evidence comprised therein that Beaver 
County as well as the Health Department knew and accepted Ferriera's plans for culinary 
water wherein each purchaser would drill his own well (R.403), and there being no 
evidence at all of a promise by subdivider to drill any wells or complete anything 
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whatever, then it should be concluded that the Division of Real Estate and the Department 
of Commerce conjured up or deliberately prevaricated respectively that Ferriera got the 
subdivision approved by Beaver County on the basis of a promise to complete the 
Division's illusion of culinary water. 
Moreover, the Southwest Utah Division of Health Feasibility Statement on date of 
May 10, 1983, says, that individual wells be drilled by each individual purchasing 
property". It does not say that individual wells wil be drilled on each lot as conjured up in 
the Division's illusion of culinary water. 
Furthermore, the foregoing facts are clear and concise in the matter of the zoning 
that was changed to A-5 to accommodate the subdivision. It should be obvious to the 
Division that their illusion of culinary water is not compatible with agricultural zoning 
where most people own 10 acres or more. Those are farms not lots. The incompatibility of 
culinary water service in A-5 zoning as well as the impracticality of drilling wells prior to 
sales has been demonstrated adequately to the Division by the Ferrieras (R. 588-589). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT FOR DUE PROCESS 
The division thinks the Ferrieras acts "constitute a threat to the public welfare" 
The Land Sales Practices Act authorizes the agency to issue a cease and desist order if the 
subdivider doesn't register lands that are not exempt and it gives the agency a right to sue 
the subdivider in district court if he doesn't obey the order but the Land Sales Practices 
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Act does not provide the agency with a discretionary right to secretly determine whether 
or not an act is a threat to the public welfare. The Utah version of the Land Sales Practices 
Act does not even authorize the agency to decide whether or not an order should be an 
emergency order as opposed to an informal cease and desist order. The Act is perfectly 
clear on this matter. An emergency order may be issued only under §57-1 l-10(2)(c). 
Contrary to what the agency avers, the overt act of selling unregistered lots that are 
thought to be exempt can not be reasonably construed to constitute a threat to the public 
welfare even if the agency did have a discretionary right in that regard. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT FOR DUE PROCESS 
E, Constitutionality Argument 
The Division claimed authority under §57-11-13 but that section does not support 
emergency orders. The validity issue is before this court because the agency failed to find 
support for their order in Ferriera's testimony on the exemption issue. On the other hand, 
if Ferreira had contested the validity or the orders instead of the exemption issue the 
Division would have construed his request for hearing the cease and desist into an 
admission of nonexempt status. Ferriera couldn't contest the Cease and Desist order 
directly because he does not know what facts they relied on when the issued the order. 
The Division is still withholding all information leading up to the issuance of the order. 
They knew and took advantage of the fact that Ferriera could not challenge the validity of 
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phantom allegations. The Ferrieras think that anyone holding a position of authority in the 
Division of Real Estate ought to know enough about The Land Sales Practices Act to 
have realized from the start that MMR is not subject to that act even without an 
investigation. There being no authority in the act to issue an emergency cease and desist 
order for failure to register an allegedly nonexempt subdivision, the Ferrieras thought the 
Division might be harboring some other kind of grievance by mistake. The Ferrieras were 
entitled to an opportunity to dispel such grievance if one existed The Ferrieras are asking 
for reverse of the cease and order under §63-46b-16(4)(a) because the Division's use of 
§57-11-1 et seq. is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 
There is no doubt that the Division did in fact start emergency proceedings under 
§63-46b-20 as charged by the Ferrieras (R. 508) and admitted by Division. (R. 563) 
Emergency proceedings are not authorized under §57-11-13 which is the only 
section they cited as authority for issuing the order. The only justification for invoking 
§63-46b-20 is the existence of an "immediate and significant danger to the public health, 
safety, or welfare" as spelled out at §63-46b-20(l)(a). MMR is not an immediate and 
significant danger requiring immediate action by the agency. However, that condition must 
be present in order to justify such an order according to §63-46b-20(l)(a). Without such 
justification, it s clear that "the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statutes ". The Ferrieras are entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(b). 
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Section §57-11-13 plainly says that if the Director thinks something is wrong, he 
can issue an order, hear the other side, and then make the order permanent if he finds then 
is a violation. Nothing in this section or any other section of the Land Sales Practices Act 
gives the agency any authority to issue an emergency cease and desist order against an 
unregistered subdivision. The Division may resort to Title 63 in cases of fraudulent 
behavior, (§57-11-14), enforcement of renewal reports, (§57-11-10), in any of its 
administrative proceedings (§57-11-3.5), or, as in (§57-11-13) (l)(d), "if the person 
served requests a hearing," (Emphasis added.). The Ferrieras have not requested a 
hearing on the cease and desist order because they do not know why the emergency ordei 
was issued. If §57-11-13 et seq. can be construed to be a proper authority for the 
procedure the Division used herein, then that section is indeed "unconstitutional on its fac< 
or as applied." The Ferrieras are therefore entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(a) 
which does not require deference to the agency. 
For example, §57-11-21 Reads as follows: 
This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it." (Emphasis added.) 
The Model Land Sales Practices Act cited in Wallis v Thomas by Chief Justici 
Maughan is included in the addendum at addendum page 693 and reads in part as follows: 
§ 12. [Cease and Desist Orders] 
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(a) If the agency determines after notice and hearing (emphasis 
added) that a person has: 
(1) violated any provision of this Act: 
(2) directly of through an agent or employee knowingly engaged in 
any false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, promotional, or sales 
methods to offer or dispose of an interest in subdivided lands; 
(3) made any substantial change in the plan of disposition and 
development of the subdivided lands subsequent to the order of registration 
without obtaining prior written approval from the agency; 
(4) disposes of any lands which have not been registered with the 
agency; or 
(5) violated any lawful order or rule of the agency; 
it may issue an order requiring the person to cease and desist from the 
unlawful practice and to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of 
the agency will carry out the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added.) 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 478.161, Florida Statutes. 
(b) if the agency makes a finding of fact in writing that the public 
interest will be irreparably harmed by delay in issuing an order, it may issue 
a temporary cease and desist order. Prior to issuing the temporary cease 
and desist order, the agency whenever possible by telephone or otherwise 
shall give notice of the proposal to issue a temporary cease and desist order 
to the person. Ever temporary cease and desist order shall include in its 
terms a provision that upon request a hearing will be held [promptly] 
[within ] to determine whether or not it becomes permanent. 
This language of the Model Act (not the comment) was imported verbatim into the 
Utah Uniform Land Sales And Time Share Act in 1977 and remained intact until replaced 
by its present version in 1991. 
It is the present version that has caused this judicial review not the former one. The 
agency should have phoned the Ferrieras before they issued the order. Petitioners' phone 
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number has been in the Beaver county phone book for many years and the number 
automatically forwards to their home/office in California. Either our present version of 
the 57-11-13 is defective or section 57-11-21 which promises uniformity is false. One or 
the other is sorely in need of revision. 
F. Due Process Argument 
The Division is determined to challenge the Ferrieras right to due process. The 
Division has not followed the rules in this case since they started it on September 30, 
1996. The cease and desist order is defective in several ways: 
a) It is premised on alleged violations of §56-11-1 et seq. which act does not 
apply to the Ferrieras by intent and purpose; 
b) An emergency order is not authorized under § 57-11-13 under which they 
claimed; 
c) An emergency order is not valid except in specific circumstances related to 
immediate and significant danger and in any event the danger has to be spelled out in the 
order according to (§63-46b-20(l)(a) and (2)(b). None of this was done (R. 1-3) but they 
admit to using an emergency order (R. 564); 
d) Ferriera is denied access to all information leading up to the issuance of the 
cease and desist order (R. 606-615). 
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e) When the Ferrieras requested review, the Division asked their superior agency 
to disregard the due process issue (R. 561). 
f) They are still trying to stop the Ferrieras from getting due process under the law 
by trying to convince everyone that they waived their right to due process (R. 561) by not 
requesting Judge Eklund to hear the due process issue after he issued his final order. 
The Ferrieras can not believe they waived their rights to due process by not letting 
Judge Eklund hear it inasmuch as he said he was already convinced that the Division had 
followed correct procedures (R. 107). 
The Ferrieras' income has been stopped for 16 months on account of the 
unauthorized cease and desist order and the adjudicative proceedings started by the 
Division of Real Estate. 
The Ferrieras are entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4). 
G* The Registration Argument 
There is no doubt that the Ferrieras filed complete application to register the 
subdivision within a few days after they became aware that the Division considered MMR 
not to be exempt because of a change in the exemption language There can be no doubt 
that that the Division still has the Ferrieras' completed application in their possession 
together with the Ferrieras' registration money. The can be no doubt that the Division has 
neither denied nor registered Ferriera's application. 
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Obviously, the division never intended to register the subdivision because they 
knew it was not subject to the Land Sales Practices in the first place and they knew is was 
exempt at §57-1 l-4(l)(f). The purpose of the cease and desist order was to delve into the 
Ferriera's personal affairs. Ferrieras bring this to issue because they believe they are 
entitled to relief under §63-46b-16(4)(e) simply because the agency "failed to follow 
prescribed procedure." 
H. Retroactive Recision Rights Argument 
There can be no doubt that the Division's letter to the Ferrieras Dated 
December 2, 1996 advised the Ferrieras of the Division's intention to delay registration 
of the subdivision as long as possible if not forever (R. 40). Everything they mentioned 
had already been provided to them in the application and the POS which they approved in 
that same letter. 
They brought the retroactive recision rights up again because they knew that was 
the one thing Ferriera would not do (R. 7-8). Ferriera is absolutely sure that no present lot 
owner wants to "rescind" his deal. If anyone should become dissatisfied in the future they 
have a right to recovery through a civil procedure under 57-11-17(2). 
For the Division to require a blanket offer of recision rights as a condition of 
registration is unreasonable and unfair inasmuch as it would appear to everyone receiving 
such an offer that possibly Ferreira had done something wrong. Title 57 does not 
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authorize the Division of Real Estate to make any such judgment or to place such a burden 
on anyone. 
I. The Right to Close Escrow Argument 
Under an emergency cease and desist order the agency is required to limit its 
actions to those required to avoid any immediate and significant danger. This would have 
been good and sufficient reason for granting the Ferrieras motion to exclude the present 
escrow from the cease and desist order. However, the Division deliberately and 
wrongfully concealed the facts of the emergency procedure form the Ferrieras. The 
Division did not reference §63-46b-20 in it cease and desist order and it did not 
demonstrate any requirement for immediate action. The Division successfully concealed 
these facts until August 8, 1997 (R. 564) six months after Ferriera's motion to exclude 
the present escrow R. 19) Their deception was deliberate and premeditated. 
The administrative law judge denied the motion to exclude the present escrow on 
vague grounds (R. 357). If the Ferrieras had been able to present that motion in light of 
§63-46b-20(2)(a), it might have had a better chance for survival. 
By falsely claiming authority for emergency action under §57-11-13 (R. 3 ) the 
Division cost the Ferrieras a bare minimum of $38,500. Therefore the substantial prejudice 
requirement of §63-46b-16(4) is clearly met. 
CONCLUSIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
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Mineral Mountain ranchos is not a promotional subdivision because it does not 
have a common plan of promotion. It is exempt because there is no promise to complete 
anything beyond what is already in place. The division violated due process when it issued 
an emergency cease and desist order without grounds. 
The essence of this case is due process. The Division served an emergency cease 
and desist order against the petitioners without a hearing and without stating the reasons 
for the agency's utilization of emergency adjudicative proceedings 
The Division stated the reason for the order was failure to register a subdivision 
but when Petitioners did register the subdivision, immediately after the order, the Division 
would not complete the registration on grounds that subdivider must first furnish blanket 
five year retroactive recision rights to everyone even though all those sales were made by 
conveyance of insured title, not by land sales contracts, and none of the buyers are 
dissatisfied with their purchases. 
The Division deliberately and repeatedly withheld information about events leading 
up to the issuance of the order which might have allowed the Ferriera to contest it or 
correct any alleged problem. Division would not permit the close of a valuable preexisting 
escrow even though the emergency order required them to limit their restrictive actions. 
The administrative law judge tried to beat Ferreira down on the due process issue 
by challenging him to argue the law with him word by word even while Ferreira was in 
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the act of demonstrating to the Division that the lands are exempt by definition and by 
statutory language. When petitioner objected to argument about due process until after 
the exemption hearing, the judge privately ruled against him and issued a final order 
without ever hearing the due process argument. The judge tried to justify his arbitrary 
action by stating in the order that he would hear objections to it if raised within 30 days 
but at the same time he declared that he was already convinced that no due process 
violations existed. 
When the mater came before the Department of Commerce for agency review, that 
department found that petitioners waived their right to due process by not opting for a 
hearing under the Administrative Law Judge knowing full well that the he had already 
ruled with prejudice on the due process issue. 
The Division's most recent attempt to frustrate the Ferrieras' right to due process 
is the Division's motion to silence this judicial review on false logic and sections of the 
code cited out of context. 
Petitioners complaint against the Division's abuse of due process is fueled by the 
Divisions lack of knowledge about real estate transactions relative to the Land Sales 
Practices Act. The Division does not understand that the act is designed to regulate 
promotional subdivisions exclusively. The Division is not qualified to recognize 
promotional subdivisions. Division does not understand that their duty under the act is to 
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enforce full disclosure not to regulate the development of the subdivisions. The division 
does not know that the purpose of the exemptions is to lessen the financial burden of 
administration. Division does not realize the difference between land sales contracts and 
transfer by conveyance of title. The Division does not know the importance of the type of 
sales documentation relative to recision rights. Division does not understand the positive 
effect of clear title at time of sale versus blanket incumbrances. The Division does not 
understand its limitations in interpreting the law as opposed to their authority in the use of 
implied expertise. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Specific Relief 
Respondent respectfully requests this court to reverse the Division of Real Estate's 
cease and desist orders and require them to do the following: 
1) Issue a letter of exemption to Respondents; 
2) Retract their cease and desist orders; 
3) Return Respondents Registration documents; 
4) Return Respondents Registration fee; 
5) Pay monthly interest on all of Respondents real property and water rights in 
Beaver County Utah from September 28, 1996 until the properties are sold or until 
September 28, 2016 whichever occurs sooner. 
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The property will be deemed sold for the above purpose whenever all of the 
following are completed to respondents satisfaction: 
a) The culinary water right is changed from .73 acre ft. per lot to .45 acre ft. per 
dwelling for all of Respondent's land in Beaver because this is what it should have been in 
the first place and respondent thinks the discrepancy must be what caused the present 
conflict. 
b) The Zoning of Respondent's land needs to be changed back to A-5. Beaver 
County destroyed the A-5 zoning with a new General Plan. 
In Lieu of Costs 
Petitioners are not lawyers and they do not have the $15,000 plus required by most 
lawyers as retainer for this case. Petitioners had to abandon all their ordinary efforts to 
produce income in order that they themselves could take on the task of preserving the past 
and future income from the sales of land in Mineral Mountain Ranchos. Therefore, they 
request restitution for their lost time in the sum of $150,000. 
Punitive Damages 
Petitioners complain that the Utah Division of Real Estate is not presently qualified 
to administer the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. Throughout this year and a half 
of forced litigation, Petitioners have tried to reason with the Division on the matters of 
due process and administration with not one sign of possible success. 
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Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request punitive damages against the Division of 
Real Estate in the amount of $300,000 or whatever other sum this court feels will impress 
the Division of their need for self study on the origin, history, and ramifications of the 
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and their administrative duties relative thereto. In 
the years to come, the state will save much more than the punitive amount mentioned, if 
the Division is precluded from improper litigation against innocent owners of non 
promotional subdivisions. 
yu^y* , _ f/hfyj£AJUj2sL<9. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Joint Petition 
for Writ of Review by depositing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the 
)L day of March, 1998 addressed to the following: 
Blaine R Ferguson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
Dated this / A day of March, 1998. O 
By: CU^L^ LJ2JL^ , 
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HRS§§ 484-1 to 484-22. 
I.C. §§ 55-1801 to 55-1823. 
K.S.A. 58-3301 to 58-3323. 
M.S.A. §§ 83.20 to 83.42. 
MCA 76-4-1201 to 76-4-1251. 
Code 1976, §§ 27-29-10 to 
27-29-210. 
U.C.A.1953, 57-11-1 to 57-11-21. 
Historical Note 
The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act 
was approved by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
and the American Bar Association, in 1966. 
It was changed to a Model Act in 1969. 
In 1968, federal legislation concerning in-
terstate land sales was enacted as the "In-
terstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act", 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1701 to 1720. The exemptions 
provisions of the federal act, specifying the 
situations when the federal act does not 
apply, may be found in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1702. 
PREFATORY NOTE 
The promotional sale of land has been popularly designated as the 
"Ten-Dollar-Down-Ten-Dollar-A-Month" lot sales plan. Land located in 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, North Carolina, and 
the Caribbean Islands, to mention a few, has been sold actively in this 
manner. It is sold not only in the places where the land is located, but 
extensively in the major metropolitan areas of the United States and 
even in major cities elsewhere in the world. 
In the past ten years there have been several national scandals 
involving fraudulent promotions, and although the majority of those 
involved in this billion dollar a year industry are operating honestly, the 
scandals have been so dramatic that state legislative activity has in-
creased substantially, and the United States Congress is presently 
considering regulatory legislation. 
At the present time approximately 50% of the states have legislation 
dealing with the promotional sale of real estate. However, the existing 
state laws on this subject vary greatly in the degree of regulation, and 
there is a substantial lack of uniformity in the application of these laws. 
Effective enforcement has been hampered by inability to apply the laws 
beyond the boundaries of the individual states and by failure to include 
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in the laws techniques available to affect transactions having contact 
with several states. 
The preparation of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act began in 
February of 1965. The drafting process included numerous drafting 
conferences with representation from all areas of the United States, and 
the Act, as adopted, reflects the comments, suggestions, and experi-
ences of representatives of the land sales industry, related industries, 
administrators, and the purchasing public. The drafters of the Act have 
utilized effective portions of existing state laws. 
The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act is designed to promote uni-
formity in the regulation of the land sales industry. Perhaps more 
importantly, the Act is designed to place individual purchasers of large 
scale promotional land offerings on an equal bargaining basis with the 
promoter-seller. It achieves this purpose by providing for the examina-
tion of the promotional offering to determine (1) that it affords full and 
fair disclosure to prospective buyers, (2) that the seller can convey 
unencumbered legal title to the purchaser, and (3) that there are 
sufficient safeguards to assure that the seller will complete the prom-
ised offsite improvements on the land. 
The Act requires a subdivider satisfying the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Act to register his land prior to offering it for sale. This 
registration requirement applies to land located within the state, and 
also to land located outside of the state if sales activity takes place 
within the state. 
Those transactions which are not considered to fall within the regula-
tory scope of the Act are expressly excluded. 
The application for registration of subdivided lands discloses pertinent 
information that will allow the agency to determine if the subdivider can 
convey the land offered for sale. Further, this information contained in 
the application provides the basis from which the agency can determine 
that there are reasonable assurances that the proposed improvements 
promised by the promoter-seller will be completed as represented. The 
Act contains a provision for the examination of the general promotional 
plan to determine if it will afford full and fair disclosure to prospective 
purchasers. If the subdivider has been involved in fraudulent promo-
tions in the past, the land will not be registered, and, therefore, cannot 
be sold to the public. After the agency is satisfied that the various 
requirements are met, the land is then registered and may be offered 
for sale to the public. As a safeguard against unfair administrative 
delays, the law provides for automatic registration if the agency has 
failed to act within 90 days after receiving the initial application. 
The principal enforcement tools of the agency are the power to issue 
cease and desist orders, to initiate and intervene in legal actions involv-
ing the subdivided lands for the purpose of protecting the rights of 
subdivision purchasers, and to suspend or revoke the registration of the 
land, thereby prohibiting further sale. 
The Act contains criminal provisions and provides for interstate rendi-
tion of those persons accused of violating the law. Important to the 
various states that will consider the enactment of this law, are the 
provisions for reciprocity between the states and for interstate investi-
gative cooperation. 
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The public offering statement required by the Uniform Act is de-
signed to afford full and fair disclosure to the purchasing public, and the 
law requires that the subdivider give each prospective purchaser a 
public offering statement as approved by the agency prior to the 
consummation of the transaction. A civil remedy is given to persons 
who have been injured through the defalcations of subdividers, in 
addition to those remedies that are afforded at common law. 
General Statutory Notes 
Alaska. Adds section as follows: 
"Sec. 34.55.006. Fraudulent and pro-
hibited practices. It is unlawful for a per-
son, in connection with the offer, sale or 
purchase of subdivided land directly or indi-
rectly, to knowingly 
"(1) employ a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud; 
"(2) make an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omit a statement of a material 
fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstanc-
es under which they are made, not mislead-
ing; or 
"(3) engage in an act; practice, or course 
of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon a person/' 
Connecticut The Connecticut act is a 
substantial adoption of the major provisions 
of the Model Act, but contains numerous 
variations, omissions and additional matter 
which cannot be clearly indicated by statu-
tory notes. 
Florida. L.1979, c. 347, renumbered, 
amended, readopted or repealed the provi-
sions of the Model Land Sales Practices 
Act, effective July 1, 1979. The new act so 
reconstituted appears as West's F.S.A. 
§§ 498.001 to 498.063. 
The Florida Land Sales Practices Act was 
generally amended by L.1981. c. 177. 
The Florida Land Sales Practices Act was 
amended by L.1982, c. 400. Note that 
L.1982, c. 400, § 3 provides that each sec-
tion within chapter 498, Florida Statutes, 
which is added or amended by that act, is 
repealed on October 1, 1988. and shall be 
reviewed by the Legislature pursuant to s. 
11.61, Florida Statutes. 
The newly constituted act remains a sub-
stantial adoption of the major provisions of 
the Model Act, but contains numerous vari-
ations, omissions and additional matter 
which cannot be clearly indicated by statu-
tory notes. 
Georgia. Adopted an act called " Georgia 
Land Sales Act of 1982" (O.C.G.A. §§ 44-
3-t to 44-3-19) which is not a substantial 
adoption of the Model Act, but contains 
some provisions similar to those in the Mod-
el Land Sales Practices Act. 
Hawaii. The Hawaii act is a substantial 
adoption of the major provisions of the 
Model Act, but contains numerous varia-
tions, omissions and additional matter which 
cannot be clearly indicated by statutory 
notes. 
Idaho. The Idaho act, which is entitled 
"Sale or Disposition of Land Located Out-
side the State", is a substantial adoption of 
the major provisions of the Model Act, but 
contains numerous variations, omissions, 
and additional matter which cannot be clear-
ly indicated by statutory notes. 
Kansas. Adds section as follows: 
"58.3320. Registration and report fees. 
"(a) For the registration of subdivided 
lands there shall be paid to the commission-
er a registration fee of ten dollars ($10), 
plus one-tenth of one percent of the maxi-
mum aggregate offering price of the reg-
istered subdivided lands to be offered in 
this state up to one hundred thousand dol-
lars ($100,000), plus one-twentieth of one 
percent of the amount in excess of one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) and not 
exceeding four hundred thousand dollars 
($400,000), plus one-fortieth of one percent 
of the amount in excess of four hundred 
thousand dollars ($400,000); but in no case 
shall such fee be greater than five hundred 
dollars ($500) for each registration: Provid-
ed, however, That the commissioner may 
prescribe a maximum amount of subdivided 
lands to be registered at any one time. If 
registration is denied or withdrawn prior to 
the offering of subdivided lands in this 
state, the commissioner shall refund all of 
the fee in excess of one hundred dollars 
($100). 
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"(b) The land and books and records of 
every person selling or offering for sale 
subdivided lands subject to the provisions of 
this act shall be subject to examination by 
the commissioner, or such other person as 
the commissioner may designate, and the 
examinee shall pay a fee for each examiner 
employed to make such examination of not 
to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each 
day or fraction thereof, plus the actual ex-
penses, including the cost of transportation 
of said examiner, while he or she is absent 
from his or her office tot the purpose of 
making said examination. 
'The commissioner may require any reg-
istrant under this act to file a semiannual 
report containing such reasonable informa-
tion as. he or she may believe necessary 
regarding the financial condition of such 
registrant and the subdivided lands sold in 
this state by such person. Each report 
shall be accompanied by a filing fee of five 
dollars ($5)." 
Minnesota. The Minnesota act is a sub-
stantial adoption of the major provisions of 
the Model Act, but contains numerous vari-
ations, omissions and additional matteT 
which cannot be clearly indicated by statu-
tory notes. 
Montana. The Montana act is a substan-
tial adoption of the major provisions of the 
Model Act, but it contains numerous varia-
tions, omissions, and additional matter 
which cannot be clearly indicated by statu-
tory notes. It should be noted that the 
Montana provisions corresponding to the 
Model Act (MCA 76^-1201 to 76-4-1251) 
relate only to instate sales of out-of-state 
subdivisions. Montana has a separate set 
of provisions (MCA 76-4-1101 to 76-4-1117) 
which relate to out-of-state sales of in-state 
subdivisions, but which do not correspond 
to the Model Act 
New Jersey. The New Jersey Land Sales 
Full Disclosure Act (NJ.S.A. 45:15-16.3 to 
45:15-16.26) is not a substantial adoption of 
the Model Act although it contains some 
similar provisions and has the same general 
purpose. 
South Carolina. Adds section as fol-
lows: 
"§ 27-29-200. Fees; land, books and 
records subject to examination by Com-
missioner; annual renewal reports. 
"(a) For the registration of subdivided 
lands there shall be paid to the Commission-
er a registration fee of ten dollars, plus one 
tenth of one percent of the maximum 
aggregate offering price of the registered 
subdivided lands to be offered in this State 
up to one hundred thousand dollars, plus 
one twentieth of one percent of the amount 
in excess of one hundred thousand dollars 
and not exceeding four hundred thousand 
dollars, plus one fortieth of one percent of 
the amount in excess of four hundred thou-
sand dollars; but in no case shall such fee 
be greater than five hundred dollars for 
each registration. Provided, however, that 
the Commissioner may prescribe a maxi-
mum amount of subdivided lands to be reg-
istered at any one time. If registration is 
denied or withdrawn prior to the offering of 
subdivided lands in this State, the Commis-
sioner shall refund all of the fee in excess 
of one hundred dollars. 
"(b) The land and books and records of 
every person selling or offering for sale 
subdivided lands subject to the provisions of 
this chapter shall be subject to examination 
by the Commissioner, or such other person 
as he may designate, and the examinee 
shall pay a fee for each examiner employed 
to make such examination of not to exceed 
twenty-five dollars for each day or fraction 
thereof, plus the actual expenses, including 
the cost of transportation of the examiner, 
while he is absent from his office for the 
purpose of making the examination. 
"(c) The Commissioner may require any 
registrant under this chapter to file an an-
nual renewal report containing such reason-
able information as he may believe neces-
sary regarding the financial condition of 
such registrant and the subdivided lands 
sold in this State by such person. Each 
renewal report shall be accompanied by a 
renewal filing fee of one hundred dollars. 
"(d) In order to carry out the provisions 
of this chapter the Commissioner shall re-
tain such fees and other funds which may 
come into his possession to defray expenses 
in the administration of this chapter/' 
Utah. The Utah Act, known as the Utah 
Uniform Land and Timeshare Sales Practic-
es Act, is a substantial adoption of the 
major provisions of the Model Act, but con-
tains numerous variations, omissions and 
additional matter which cannot be clearly 
indicated by statutory notes. 
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Section 
1. Definitions. 
2. Administrative Agency. 
3. Exemptions. 
4. Prohibitions on Dispositions of Interests in Subdivisions. 
5. Application for Registration. 
6. Public Offering Statement. 
7. Inquiry and Examination. 
8. Notice of Filing and Registration. 
9. Annual Report. 
10. General Powers and Duties. 
11. Investigations and Proceedings. 
12. Cease and Desist Orders. 
13. Revocation. 
14. Judicial Review. 
15. Penalties. 
16. Civil Remedy. 
17. Jurisdiction. 
18. Interstate Rendition. 
19. Service of Process. 
20. Uniformity of Interpretation. 
21. Short Title. 
22. Severability. 
23. Repeal. 
24. Effective Date. 
§ 1 . [Definitions] 
When used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(1) "disposition" includes sale, lease, assignment, award by lottery, 
or any other transaction concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for 
gain or profit; 
COMMENT 
Experience has shown the specific The term "disposition" is the broadest 
terms, sale, lease, assignment, etc., are possible term and is intended to in-
not broad enough to cover many of the elude transactions in which no inci-
transactions used by land promoters, dents of legal title are transferred. 
(2) "offer" includes every inducement, solicitation, or attempt to 
encourage a person to acquire an interest in land, if undertaken for 
gain or profit; 
COMMENT 
Modeled after section 401(h), Uni-
form Securities Act. 
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(3) ''person'' means an individual, corporation, government, or gov-
ernmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partner-
ship, unincorporated association, two or more of any of the foregoing 
having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial 
entity; 
COMMENT 
Modeled after the Uniform Statutory Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices 
Construction Act, section 26, and the Act. 
(4) "purchaser" means a person who acquires or attempts to acquire 
or succeeds to an interest in land; 
COMMENT 
"Purchaser" is defined in this man- by gift, inheritance, or otherwise, in 
ner to include persons who are not order to eliminate the necessity of priv-
successful in their attempts to acquire ity with the subdivider as a prerequi-
land because of invalid title or other
 s i t e t 0 a s s e r t ing rights granted under 
reasons, and also to include those per-
 t ^ ^ t 
sons who succeed to an interest in land 
(5) "subdivider" means any owner of subdivided land who offers it 
for disposition or the principal agent of an inactive owner; 
COMMENT 
Modeled after section 337, Article may be desirable in defining "subdivi-
9-A, New York Real Property Law. der" in subsection (5). Such language 
This definition does not include a trust should be directed to excluding from 
company that holds bare legal title in that definition a trustee holding bare 
trust for the use and benefit of anoth- iegai title t o subdivided land, and to 
er or other inactive owner if sales are including within that definition the 
made through a promoter beneficial owner under the trust. 
In those states in which subdivid-
ed" lands are commonly sold by use of lt i s n o t believed that any additional 
a subdivision trust, under which bare language is needed where a bank or 
legal title to the land is held by a other corporation or individual holds 
corporate trustee, additional language the bare legal title in trust 
(6) "subdivision" and "subdivided lands" mean any land which is 
divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into 
[25] or more lots, parcels, units, or interests and also includes any land 
whether contiguous or not if [25] or more lots, parcels, units, or 
interests are offered as a part of a common promotional plan of 
advertising and sale. 
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Note 2 
COMMENT 
Copied in part from section 11.000 
California Real Estate Law, and in 
part from section 478.021(5) Florida 
Statutes. It should be noted that this 
definition does not require the land to 
be presently subdivided, nor does it 
require the land to be contiguous. A 
subdivider who offers land located in 
several different areas or states will be 
subject to this Act if the land is dis-
posed of pursuant to a common promo-
tional plan. Although each case must 
be examined independently, normally a 
common promotional plan is one which 
utilizes common advertising and sales 
methods to the extent that the offering 
begins to take on the character of a 
fungible. 
Even though the number 25 is brack-
eted, it is recommended that this Act 
apply only to subdivisions of 25 or 
more lots, parcels or units. The typi-
cal promotional subdivision, to be fi-
nancially successful, normally has a 
minimum of 25 parcels. It would be 
unduly costly and burdensome to re-
quire smaller subdividers to comply 
with the registration procedure set out 
in this Act, and could overburden the 
agency with an unnecessary amount of 
administrative work. Further, the 
subdivisions of 25 or fewer lots are 
usually offered within a local area, 
thereby giving prospective purchasers 
an adequate opportunity to examine 
the land and to be familiar with the 
character and reputation of the subdi-
vider. 
Action in Adopting: Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: 
Alaska. Subd. (6) reads: " 'subdivision7 
and 'subdivided land' mean land which is 
divided or is proposed to be divided for the 
purpose of disposition into two or more lots, 
units or interests and also includes any land 
whether contiguous or not if two or more 
lots, parcels, units or interests are offered 
as a part of a common promotional plan of 
advertising and sale; if the land is contig-
uous or is known, designated or advertised 
as a common unit or by a common name, 
the land shall be presumed, without regard 
to the number of lots covered by each indi-
vidual offering, as being offered for disposi-
tion as part of a common promotional 
plan;". 
Kansas. In subd. (2), substitutes "any" 
for "every". 
In subd. (6), inserts the phrase "situated 
within or without the state of Kansas" pre-
ceding "which is divided" and substitutes 
"(50)" for "[25]" in both instances. 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=*861. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
and 
Offer 2 
Subdivided lands 1 
Notes of Decisions 
Act. Wallis v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d 
39. 
1. Subdivided lands 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act clearly 
indicates that land need not be presently 
subdivided but only be proposed to be subdi-
vided for purpose of disposition to consti-
tute "subdivided lands" within meaning of 
2. Offer 
Postsale conduct designed to induce the 
continuation of payments does not consti-
tute an "offer" for purposes of the Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act State v. First 
Nat. Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 
P.2d 406. 
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This Act shall be administered by [insert appropriate administrative 
agency and any related provisions on selection and remuneration of 
personnel, budget, annual reports, fees, and other administrative provi-
sions which are appropriate to the particular state] which hereinafter is 
called the agency. 
COMMENT 
§ 2 . [Administrative Agency] 
Each state may place the administra-
tion of this Act under the agency it 
deems most appropriate. Normally, 
the state real estate commission is the 
designated agency, but several states 
with laws of this kind have taken other 
approaches. For example, New York 
places the responsibility on the Secre-
tary of State, Ohio in the Securities 
Commission, Florida in the Installment 
JLand Sales Board, Michigan in the Cor-
poration Securities Commission, Maine 
in the Department of Banks and Bank-
ing, and New Mexico with the Attor-
ney General. 
Incorporated within this section. 
should be provisions for financing the 
agency. Whether the agency should 
be financed from fees collected or 
through a general appropriation or 
Trade Regulation <s=*861. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
1. Rules and regulations 
Notice that the Department of Commerce 
proposed to adopt regulations in Title III of 
the Administrative Code to implement the 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act with re-
spect to general provisions, filing proce-
dures, unfair acts and practices, advertising 
and promotion plans, protection of purchas-
ers, and severability was adequate. State 
v. First Nat Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 
1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
some other method, should be deter-
mined by each state. 
The cost of administering this law-
will vary in each state, and will depend 
primarily on whether the state is clas-
sified as a situs state, an investor 
state, or a combination of both. Flor-
ida, which has a separate regulatory 
agency of regulating promotional land 
sales, registers approximately 200 sub-
dividers and approximately 3,000 sales-
men. The agency employs 12 to 14 
personnel including the executive di-
rector, attorneys, investigators and 
clerical personnel. The agency has op-
erated on an annual budget of $115,-
000 to $135,000. The annual budget of 
the Florida agency is funded exclusive-
ly from fees collected. 
Regulations which had been adopted to 
implement the Uniform Land Sales Practic-
es Act prior to the time it was amended to 
apply to in-state land sales as well as out-of-
state land sales were required to be repro-
mulgated after the adoption of amendments 
to the Act making it applicable to in-state 
land sales; failure to repromulgate the reg-
ulations did not deprive developer of due 
process. State v. First Nat Bank of An-
chorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
Library References 
Notes of Decisions 
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§ 3 . [Exemptions] 
(a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of 
evasion of this Act, the provisions of this Act do not apply to offers or 
dispositions of an interest in land: 
(1) by a purchaser of subdivided lands for his own account in a 
single or isolated transaction; 
COMMENT 
This subsection is modeled after sec- comply with this Act upon resale even 
tion 402(b)(1) Uniform Securities Act, though the lands have been previously 
and it is designed to make it unneces- registered. 
sary for an individual lot purchaser to 
(2) if fewer than [25] separate lots, parcels, units, or interests in 
subdivided lands are offered by a person in a period of [12] months; 
COMMENT 
disposition. In order to qualify under 
this exemption, the owner must not 
only refrain from selling, but must 
refrain from offering the requisite 
number of lots for sale. 
(3) on which there is a residential, commercial, or industrial building, 
or as to which there is a legal obligation on the part of the seller to 
construct such a building within [2] years from date of disposition; 
(4) to persons who are engaged in the business of construction of 
buildings for resale, or to persons who acquire an interest in subdivid-
ed lands for the purpose of engaging and do engage in the business of 
construction of buildings for resale; 
COMMENT 
The exemptions of subsections (3) structural improvements and will elimi-
and (4) are designed to limit the appli- nate those persons engaged exclusive-
cation of the Act to land upon which iy j n the homebuilding business, 
the seller has no obligation to build 
(5) pursuant to court order; 
(6) by any government or government agency; 
(7) as cemetery lots or interests. 
(b) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of 
evasion of this Act, the orovisions of this Act do not apply to: 
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This exemption will exclude all local-
ly oriented offerings and will allow the 
seller to take advantage of the exemp-
tion even though the subdivision may 
be large enough to qualify, by restrict-
ing the amount of land offered for 
§3 LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT 
(1) offers or dispositions of evidences of indebtedness secured by a 
mortgage or deed of trust of real estate; 
(2) offers or dispositions of securities or units of interest issued by a 
real estate investment trust regulated under any state or federal 
statute; 
(3) a subdivision as to which the plan of disposition is to dispose to 
10 or fewer persons;. 
COMMENT 
This exemption is designed to cover tots, but if it is offered for disposition 
those persons who develop land for to ten or fewer persons, the transac-
wholesale distribution. The subdivi- tion is nevertheless exempt 
sion may contain a large number of 
(4) a subdivision as to which the agency has granted an exemption 
as provided in section 10; 
COMMENT 
This subsection allows the agency to ty in order that the regulatory empha-
exempt an offering which is locally sis remains principally on the promo-
oriented and of a non-promotional na- tional offering, 
ture. It is designed to afford flexibili-
(5) offers or dispositions of securities currently registered with the 
[Commissioner of Securities] of this State; and 
(6) offers or dispositions of any interest in oil, gas, or other minerals 
or any royalty interest therein if the offers or dispositions of such 
interests are regulated as securities by the United States or by the 
[Commissioner of Securities] of this State. 
COMMENT 
The exemptions stated in subsections al offering is already registered as a 
(5) and (6) are designed to avoid dupli- security and regulated by another 
cation of regulation. If the promotion- agency, the Act will not apply. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: 
Alaska. In subd. (a) introductory clause, 
inserts "registration" preceding "provisions 
of this Act". 
Subd. (aX2) reads: "if fewer than 10 sepa-
rate lots, parcels, units or interests in subdi-
vided land located outside this state are 
offered by a subdivider in a period of 12 
months, or if fewer than 50 separate lots, 
parcels, units or interests in subdivided land 
located in this state are offered by a subdi-
vider in a period of 12 months;". 
In subd. (a), adds a paragraph (8) which 
reads: "if the land is located in this state 
and is registered or exempt from registra-
tion under the provisions of the federal 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 
(15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)." 
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Kansas. In subd. (a)(1), inserts "or her" Omits subd. (b)(5) and (6). 
following "his". 
T LJ / vox u *•*. * .«*•**. /cm" i? South Carolina. Omits subd. (b)(5) and 
In subd. (a)(2), substitutes fifty (50) for .„ 
"[25]". l '* 
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Notes of Decisions 
Generally 1 tion was inapplicable in transaction between 
Standard of care 2 subdivider and purchaser. Wallis v. Thom-
as, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d 39. 
1. Generally 2- Standard of care 
Section of Uniform Land Sales Practices In view of fact that the Land Sales Prac-
Act which provides that Act does not apply tices Act exempts from the Act's coverage 
to offers or dispositions of interest in land those subdividers offering fewer than 50 
by purchaser of subdivided lands for his lots within the state during a 12-month peri-
own account in a single or isolated transac- od, it would be both illogical and unjust to 
tion was designed to make it unnecessary hold such small tract subdividers to a high-
for individual lot purchasers to comply with er standard of care than that applicable to 
act upon resale even though lands had been their large-scale competitors. Stepanov v. 
previously registered; thus, such subsec- Gavrilovich, Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30. 
§ 4 . [Prohibitions on Dispositions of Interests in Subdivisions] 
Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt by section 3: 
(1) no person may offer or dispose of any interest in subdivided 
lands located in this State nor offer or dispose in this State of any 
interest in subdivided lands located without this State prior to the time 
the subdivided lands are registered in accordance with this Act; 
COMMENT 
Modeled after section 201(2) Uniform 
Securities Act. 
(2) no person may dispose of any interest in subdivided lands unless 
a current public offering statement is delivered to the purchaser and 
the purchaser is afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the 
public offering statement prior to the disposition. 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 337-b(4) Article chaser to be afforded a reasonable op-
9A, New York Real Property Law and portunity to examine the public offer-
section 11018.1 California Real Estate ing statement before consummation of 
Law. This section requires the pur- the transaction. 
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text- or without this state prior to the time the 
Alaska. Subd. (1) reads: "no person may subdivided lands required under the act to 
offer or dispose of in this state an interest b e registered are duly registered in accord-
in subdivided land before the time the sub- a n c e w t h t ™ ac t^ • 
divided land is registered in accordance with
 S o u t h Carolina. Subd. (1) reads: "No 
this chapter." person may in this State offer or dispose of 
Kansas. Subd. (1) reads: "No person any interest in subdivided lands prior to the 
may in this state offer or dispose of any time the subdivided lands are registered in 
interest in subdivided lands located within accordance with this chapter/' 
Library References 
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Notes of Decisions 
1. Generally vided land, lot sellers were liable to pur-
„ _ . , ,
 £ chasers for such illegal sales, subject to any 
Where none of three orange groves from
 a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e of limitations which could 
which sales of lots were made to Canadian
 s t a n ( j -m fc^ 0f individual class member's 
citizens was registered under Florida stat- claim. Ferland v. Orange Groves of Flor-
utes applying to sale of interests in subdi- ida, Inc., D.C.Fla.1974, 377 F.Supp. 690. 
§ 5. [Application for Registration] 
(a) The application for registration of subdivided lands shall be filed as 
prescribed by the agency's rules and shall contain the following doc-
uments and information: 
(1) an irrevocable appointment of the agency to receive service of 
any lawful process in any non-criminal proceeding arising under this 
Act against the applicant or his personal representative; 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 414(g) Uniform rather than when the subdivider is op-
Securities Act, except that the irrev- erating through an agent. (See section 
ocable consent is given at all times 19, infra, for method of service.) 
(2) a legal description of the subdivided lands offered for registra-
tion, together with a map showing the division proposed or made, the 
dimensions of the lots, parcels, units, or interests and the relation of 
the subdivided lands to existing streets, roads, and other off-site 
improvements; 
(3) the states or jurisdictions in which an application for registration 
or similar document has been filed and any adverse order, judgment, 
or decree entered in connection with the subdivided lands by the 
regulatory authorities in each jurisdiction or by any court; 
680 
LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT §5 
(4) the applicant's name and address, and the form, date, and 
jurisdiction of organization; and the address of each of its offices in 
this State; 
(5) the name, address, and principal occupation for the past five 
years of every director and officer of the applicant or person occupy-
ing a similar status or performing similar functions; the extent and 
nature of his interest in the applicant or the subdivided lands as of a 
specified date within 30 days of the filing of the application; 
(6) a statement, in a form acceptable to the agency, of the condition 
of the title to the subdivided lands including encumbrances as of a 
specified date within 30 days of the date of application by a title 
opinion of a licensed attorney, not a salaried employee, officer, or 
director of the applicant or owner, or by other evidence of title 
acceptable to the agency; 
(7) copies of the instruments which will be delivered to a purchaser 
to evidence his interest in the subdivided lands and of the contracts 
and other agreements which a purchaser will be required to agree to 
or sign; 
(8) copies of the instruments by which the interest in the subdivided 
lands was acquired and a statement of any lien or encumbrance upon 
the title and copies of the instruments creating the lien or encum-
brance, if any, with data as to recording; 
(9) if there is a lien or encumbrance affecting more than one lot, 
parcel, unit, or interest a statement of the consequences for a purchas-
er of failure to discharge the lien or encumbrance and the steps, if any, 
taken to protect the purchaser in case of this eventuality; 
(10) copies of instruments creating easements, restrictions, or other 
encumbrances, affecting the subdivided lands; 
(11) a statement of the zoning and other governmental regulations 
affecting the use of the subdivided lands and also of any existing tax 
and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments which affect the 
subdivided lands; 
(12) a statement of the existing provisions for access, sewage dis-
posal, water, and other public utilities in the subdivision; a statement 
of the improvements to be installed; the schedule for their completion; 
and a statement as to the provisions for improvement maintenance; 
COMMENT 
The information in this subsection of standard improvements such as ac-
will be helpful to the agency in deter- cess and utilities and whether or not a 
mining whether the advertising and public agency has undertaken the re-
the public offering statement give suf- sponsibility for maintaining the im-
ficient information about the existence provements. Also, the section re-
681 
§5 LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT 
quires a schedule for completion, if the agency to follow the progress of the 
promised improvements are not in ex- subdivider with respect to his obliga-
istence. This schedule will enable the tions for completion of improvements. 
(13) a narrative description of the promotional plan for the disposi-
tion of the subdivided lands together with copies of all advertising 
material which has been prepared for public distribution by any means 
of communication; 
COMMENT 
This information will enable the and the manner in which the property 
agency to determine the areas in which will be offered, 
the subdivider will offer its property 
(14) the proposed public offering statement; 
(15) any other information, including any current financial state-
ment, which the agency by its rules requires for the protection of 
purchasers. 
COMMENT 
Section 5(a) lists the principal infor- tutes a compilation of various require-
mation to be submitted to the agency ments required by the jurisdictions 
in order that it may determine whether presently regulating land promotions, 
the subdivider can convey legal title,
 I f t h e enacting state currently regu-
has the resources to complete prom-
 l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n offerings, a grandfa-
lsed improvements, and whether the ,u . . » ,» ,8 J * J •. 
advertising materikl relating to the ther provision should be adopted to 
subdivision offers full and fair disclo- a v 0 l d interrupting the operation of a 
sure. This section principally consti- SomS business. 
(b) If the subdivider registers additional subdivided lands to be offered 
for disposition, he may consolidate the subsequent registration with any 
earlier registration offering subdivided lands for disposition under the 
same promotional plan. 
(c) The subdivider shall immediately report any material changes in 
the information contained in an application for registration. 
COMMENT 
Section 478.161(l)(c) Florida Stat-
utes; section 11012, California Real 
Property Law. 
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: "agency", wherever appearing, except in 
Kansas. Makes minor language changes s u b d - (a)(1) where "Kansas securities corn-
relating to gender without affecting sub- missioner" is substituted for "agency", 
stance and substitutes "commissioner" for 
Library References 
Trade Regulation e=>863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
Notes of Decisions 
1. Construction with other laws registration requirements of Uniform Land 
~ .. - ^ Sales Practices Act, but does not immunize 
Exemption from registration provisions
 s e l l e r s f r o m l i a b i % u n d e r t h e U L g p A f()p 
of the Federal Interstate Luid Sales Full
 f r a u c L S t a t e V- F]rst N a L B a n k o f A n c h o r . 
Disclosure Act provides exemption from
 age, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
§ 6. [Public Offering Statement] 
(a) A public offering statement shall disclose fully and accurately the 
physical characteristics of the subdivided lands offered and shall make 
known to prospective purchasers all unusual and material circumstances 
or features affecting the subdivided lands. The proposed public offering 
statement submitted to the agency shall be in a form prescribed by its 
rules and shall include the following: 
(1) the name and principal address of the subdivider; 
(2) a general description of the subdivided lands stating the total 
number of lots, parcels, units, or interests in the offering; 
COMMENT 
An integral part of many promotions whether the subdivider (the buyer's 
is an emphasis on the resale potential chief competitor when he wishes to 
of the lands offered for sale. This resell) has an adequate supply of lots 
section of the public offering state-
 t 0 m e e t f u t u r e demand, 
ment is designed to show the buyer 
(3) the significant terms of any encumbrances, easements, liens, and 
restrictions, including zoning and other regulations affecting the subdi-
vided lands and each unit or lot, and a statement of all existing taxes 
and existing or proposed special taxes or assessments which affect the 
subdivided lands; 
(4) a statement of the use for which the property is offered; 
(5) information concerning improvements, including streets, water 
supply, levees, drainage control systems, irrigation systems, sewage 
disposal facilities, and customary utilities, and the estimated cost, date 
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of completion, and responsibility for construction and maintenance of 
existing and proposed improvements which are referred to in connec-
tion with the offering or disposition of any interest in subdivided lands; 
(6) additional information required by the agency to assure full and 
fair disclosure to prospective purchasers. 
COMMENT 
Section 6(a) is copied from Section tained in the statement. New York 
338.1, Article 9-A, New York Real has established a public offering pro-
Property Law and Chapter 188-6, spectus which is analogous to a securi-
Rules and Regulations of Florida In- ties prospectus. Florida, on the other 
stallment Land Sales Board. At the hand, has a property report which is 
present time about one-half of the designed to furnish the prospective 
states engaged in the _ regulation of purchaser with information which a 
subdivision sales provide for some prudent and cautious buyer would nor-
form of public report, prospectus, of-
 mally evaluate prior to purchase, 
fering statement, or property report. 
In this section this document is desig- lt 1S f e l t &** t}}e P*bllc offering 
nated a public offering statement A statement should be thorough, but 
great deal of attention has been fo- should be simple and concise. It 
cused upon this matter and it has been should not contain such minutiae of 
a subject of discussion at various con- detail as to lose the interest of the 
ferences throughout the United States, reader, but should be sufficiently de-
While the purpose of the public report tailed and simple to reasonably assure 
has been generally agreed to be the that the prospective purchaser will un-
providing of pertinent and material in- derstand the material aspects of the 
formation concerning the subdivision offering and the conditions of the prop-
to the prospective purchaser, there ex- erty at the time the offering is made, 
ists a wide variance of opinion as to and information concerning improve-
the information that should be con- ments to the subdivision. 
(b) The public offering statement shall not be used for any promotion-
al purposes before registration of the subdivided lands and afterwards 
only if it is used in its entirety. No person may advertise or represent 
that the agency approves or recommends the subdivided lands or disposi-
tion thereof. No portion of the public offering statement may be 
underscored, italicized, or printed in larger or heavier or different color 
type than the remainder of the statement unless the agency requires it. 
(c) The agency may require the subdivider to alter or amend the 
proposed public offering statement in order to assure full and fair 
disclosure to prospective purchasers, and no change in the substance of 
the promotional plan or plan of disposition or development of the 
subdivision may be made after registration without notifying the agency 
and without making appropriate amendment of the public offering state-
ment. A public offering statement is not current unless all amendments 
are incorporated. 
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Note 2 
COMMENT 
The public offering statement re-
quired by this section is originally pre-
pared by the subdivider and edited by 
the agency. This differs from the pub-
lic report now used by some states 
which is prepared initially by the ad-
ministrative agency. The requirement 
for amending the public offering state-
ment is copied from Section 337-b(7), 
Article 9-A, New York Real Property 
Law. 
Action in Adopting: Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: 
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner'' for 
"agency", wherever appearing. 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=>863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
and 
Notes of Decisions 
Change in offering 2 
Construction with other laws 
Instructions 3 
1. Construction with other laws 
Purchasers' action under statute making 
it "* * * unlawful for any person to make 
or disseminate or cause to be made or disse-
minated before the general public of the 
state, or any portion thereof, any mislead-
ing advertisement * * *" was not preempt-
ed by Uniform Land Sales Practices Law. 
Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding 
Club, Ltd., Fla.App.1981, 403 So.2d 1367. 
2. Change in offering 
Term "offering" as used in section of 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Law provid-
ing that after order of registration has been 
issued no material change of the offering 
shall be made by subdivider without notifi-
cation and written approval must refer to 
something that was in existence before or-
der of registration was issued and which it 
is within power of subdivider to change, 
alter, or modify but which legislature con-
sidered should not be changed, altered, or 
modified without prior approval of Division 
of Land Sales and Condominiums of the 
Department of Business Regulation. Jaffe 
v. State, Fla.App. 5 Distl983, 438 So.2d 72, 
petition for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99. 
Proposed advertising material, proposed 
public offering statement, and proposed 
contracts and other agreements which pur-
chaser is required to execute under Uni-
form Land Sales Practices Law were includ-
ed within the term "offering" as used in 
section of statute providing that after order 
of registration has been issued no material 
change of the offering shall be made by 
subdivider without notification and written 
approval. Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5 Dist. 
1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review dis-
missed 436 So.2d 99. 
In prosecution under section of Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Law providing that 
after order of registration has been issued 
no material change of the offering shall be 
made by subdivider without notification and 
written approval,, even if allegations of 
charging document had accurately tracked 
statute, proof at trial that defendant had 
executed and delivered quitclaim, rather 
than warranty, deeds as promised in agree-
ment for deed would not have sustained 
such allegations. Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5 
Dist.1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review 
dismissed 436 So.2d 99. 
Term "offering" in section of Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Law providing that 
after order of registration has been issued 
no material change of the offering shall be 
made by subdivider without notification and 
written approval does not mean or include 
order of registration, and thus counts 
charging unlawful land sales practices 
based on material alteration, change, or 
modification of order of registration were 




change, alteration, or modification of "the 
offering;' Jaffe v. State, Fla.App. 5 Dist. 
1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition for review dis-
missed 436 So.2d 99. 
3. Instructions 
Even if term "offering" in section of Uni-
form Land Sales Practices Law providing 
that after order of registration has been 
issued no material change of the offering 
shall be made by subdivider without notifi-
cation and written approval included order 
of registration, it was reversible error for 
trial court to instruct jury that issuance of 
LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT 
quitclaim deeds to contract purchasers in 
lieu of warranty deeds as provided in agree-
ments for deed was, as a matter of law, 
material change, alteration, or modification 
of order of registration; whether any al-
leged change, alteration, or modification of 
offering was material in given instance de-
pended on substance of change, alteration, 
or modification and subject matter and con-
text and, as in fraud and similar cases, was 
question of fact for jury. Jaffe v. State, 
Fla.App. 5 Dist.1983, 438 So.2d 72, petition 
for review dismissed 436 So.2d 99. 
§ 7. [Inquiry and Examination] 
Upon receipt of an application for registration in proper form, the 
agency shall forthwith initiate an examination to determine that: 
(1) the subdivider can convey or cause to be conveyed the interest in 
subdivided lands offered for disposition if the purchaser complies with 
the terms of the offer, and when appropriate, that release clauses, 
conveyances in trust, or other safeguards have been provided; 
(2) there is reasonable assurance that all proposed improvements 
will be completed as represented; 
(3) the advertising material and the general promotional plan are not 
false or misleading and comply with the standards prescribed by the 
agency in its rules and afford full and fair disclosure; 
(4) the subdivider has not, or if a corporation, its officers, directors, 
and principals have not, been convicted of a crime involving land 
dispositions or any aspect of the land sales business in this State, the 
United States, or any other state or foreign country within the past 
[10] years and has not been subject to any injunction or administrative 
order entered within the past [10] years restraining a false or mislead-
ing promotional plan involving land dispositions; 
(5) the public offering statement requirements of this Act have been 
satisfied. 
COMMENT 
States regulating the land sales in- in advance to determine that it is fair, 
dustry generally fall into three catego- just and equitable before registration, 
ries—(1) those which merely prosecute This Act combines to some degree each 
subdividers for fraudulent statements, of the foregoing theories. There are 
(2) those which require affirmative ac- criminal provisions for fraud and non-
tion in achieving full and fair disclo- compliance. Full and fair disclosure is 
sure from subdividers in their advertis- achieved by requiring the public offer-
ing and promotional materials, and (3) ing statement and through the option 
those which examine the offering itself of supervising advertising. This Act 
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does not direct the agency to make a ability to convey title to the lands of-
determination as to whether the offer- fered, and if he promises improve-
ing is fair, just and equitable, on the
 m e n t s , that he is in a position to guar-
theory that this decision is better made
 a n t e e completion. The agencv must 
by the well-informed purchaser rather
 a J s o d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e s u b d i v-d e r > o r 
than an administrator. The Act does, .» ,. . . , , ^ 
however, go further than full and fair *f a corporation, its principals, have not 
disclosure since it requires proof and b e e n ^^olved in fraudulent promotions 
assurances that the subdivider has the wrthin t h e l a s t ten years. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: In subd. (3), inserts ''or regulations" fol-
Kansas. Substitutes ''commissioner'' for * 
"agency", wherever appearing. In subd. (4), omits "entered". 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=863. 
C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 8 . [Notice of Filing and Registration] 
(a) Upon receipt of the application for registration in proper form, the 
agency shall issue a notice of filing to the applicant. Within [90] days 
from the date of the notice of filing, the agency shall enter an order 
registering the subdivided lands or rejecting the registration. If no 
order of rejection is entered within [90] days from the date of notice of 
filing, the land shall be deemed registered unless the applicant has 
consented in writing to a delay. 
COMMENT 
Modeled after Section 478.141(3) registration. This section affords an 
Florida Statutes. This section pre- additional remedy to an applicant and 
vents the administrative agency from is not a substitute for existing common 
arbitrarily delaying the application for law or statutory prerogative writs. 
(b) If the agency affirmatively determines, upon inquiry and examina-
tion, that the requirements of section 7 have been met, it shall enter an 
order registering the subdivided lands and shall designate the form of 
the public offering statement. 
(c) If the agency determines upon inquiry and examination that any of 
the requirements of section 7 has not been met, it shall notify the 
applicant that the application for registration must be corrected in the 
particulars specified within [10] days. If the requirements are not met 
within the time allowed the agency shall enter an order rejecting the 
registration, which shall include the findings of fact upon which the 
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order is based. The order rejecting the registration shall not become 
effective for [20] days, during which time the applicant may petition for 
reconsideration and is entitled to a hearing. 
COMMENT 
Modeled in part after Section 9(g) ceipt of a waiver of the ninety day 
1961 Model State Administrative Pro- deadline required by Section 8(a). The 
cedures Act. The preorder notice en-
 p o s t order petition for reconsideration 
ables the applicant to amend the appli-
 i s designed to give the applicant fur-
cation prior to the time an adverse
 t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s e n t h i s p o s i t i o n 
order is rendered. If the appropriate . ., r r , . . J, ,. r . 
corrective measures cannot be taken to *he admumtrative agency pnor to 
within the ten day period, the agency. **f*** Judlcial r e v i e w o f t h e agency's 
may grant an additional time upon re- order. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: South Carolina, In subd. (c), substitutes 
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for "fifteen" for "[10]" days. 
"agency", wherever appearing, and makes 
some minor language changes without af-
fecting substance. 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <3=»863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 9 . [Annual Report] 
(a) Within [30] days after each annual anniversary date of an order 
registering subdivided lands, the subdivider shall file a report in the form 
prescribed by the rules of the agency. The report shall reflect any 
material changes in information contained in the original application for 
registration. 
(b) The agency may permit the filing of annual reports within [30] 
days after the anniversary date of the consolidated registration in lieu of 
the anniversary date of the original registration. 
COMMENT 
See section 5(b). Many subdividers subdivided lands should be made cur-
will register additional subdivided rent Normally a consolidated regis-
lands to be offered under the same tratdon would obviate the necessity of 
promotional plan during the course of an annual report until one year after 
the year. Upon each subsequent filing the order registering and consolidating 
all of the information relating to the the additional subdivided lands. 
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text- the report may, at the option of the commis-
Kansas. In subd. (a), substitutes "com- sioner, be consolidated with the required 
missioner" for "rules of the agency". annual renewal report. 
In subd. (b), substitutes "The commission- j n subd. (b), inserts "at his option" pre-
er at his or her option" for "The agency".
 c e d i n g « m a y p e r m i t » . 
South Carolina. In subd. (a), inserts "re-
newal" following "file a" and provides that 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=*863. 
C.J.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 10« [General Powers and Duties] 
(a) The agency shall prescribe reasonable rules which may be adopted, 
amended, or repealed [in compliance with the administrative procedure 
act] [after a public hearing with notice thereof published once in a 
newspaper or newspapers with statewide circulation not less than 5 days 
nor more than 15 days prior to the hearing and mailed to all subdividers 
not less than 5 days nor more than 15 days prior to the public hearing]. 
The rules shall include but need not be limited to: 
(1) provisions for advertising standards to assure full and fair 
disclosure; 
(2) provisions for escrow or trust agreements or other means rea-
sonably to assure that all improvements referred to in the application 
for registration and advertising will be completed and that purchasers 
will receive the interest in land contracted for; 
(3) provisions for operating procedures; and 
(4) other rules necessary and proper to accomplish the purpose of 
this Act. 
COMMENT 
Modeled after Section 478.041(5), 
Florida Statutes. 
(b) The agency by rule or order, after reasonable notice and hearing, 
may require the filing of advertising material relating to subdivided 
lands prior to its distribution. 
COMMENT 
This Act does not require the filing their distribution, but if the agency 
of all advertising materials prior to finds such filing is desirable either for 
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all subdividers or particular subdivid- so by rule or order after notice and 
ers, it is specifically authorized to do hearing. 
(c) If it appears that a person has engaged or is about to engage in an 
act or practice constituting a violation of a provision of this Act or a rule 
or order hereunder, the agency, with or without prior administrative 
proceedings, may bring <an action in the [insert the name of the appropri-
ate court] to enjoin the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with 
this Act or any rule or order hereunder. Upon proper showing, injunc-
tive relief or temporary restraining - orders shall be granted, and a 
receiver or conservator may be appointed. The agency is not required to 
post a bond in any court proceedings. 
COMMENT 
This section is modeled after section 
408 of the Uniform Securities Act. 
(d) The agency may intervene in a suit involving subdivided lands. In 
any suit by or against a subdivider involving subdivided lands, the 
subdivider promptly shall furnish the agency notice of the suit and copies 
of all pleadings. 
COMMENT 
Modeled after section 478.132(7), 
Florida Statutes. 
(e) The agency may: 
(1) accept registrations filed in other states or with the federal 
government; 
(2) contract with similar agencies in this State or other jurisdictions 
to perform investigative functions; 
(3) accept grants in aid from any source. 
(f) The agency shall cooperate with similar agencies in other jurisdic-
tions to establish uniform filing procedures and forms, uniform public 
offering statements, advertising standards, rules, and common adminis-
trative practices. 
COMMENT 
These important subsections enable for the purpose of uniformity. With-
the agency to establish reciprocal out uniformity of regulation with re-
agreements with similar agencies in spect to matters such as advertising 
other jurisdictions and within the state standards, subdividers promoting land 
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nation-wide might frequently be frus-
trated by inconsistent rules. Through 
reciprocal agreements the agency will 
§10 
Note 2 
also greatly facilitate its ability to en-
force the Act and reduce the cost of 
the administration and investigation. 
(g) The agency may exempt a subdivision of [. J or fewer lots, 
parcels, units, or interests from the provisions of this Act if it determines 
that the plan of promotion and disposition is primarily directed to 
persons in the local community in which the subdivision is situated. 
COMMENT 
See section 3(b)(4). This section is 
designed to allow the agency to ex-
clude from its jurisdiction those subdi-
visions which are local in nature and in 
which prospective purchasers are fa-
miliar with the land and the nature of 
the offering. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Blanks to be filled in, subd. (g): 
Alaska. See variation note, infra. 
Kansas. See variation note, infra. 
South Carolina, "one hundred". 
for Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" 
"agency", wherever appearing. 
In subd. (a), substitutes "shall" for 
"may" preceding "be adopted" and uses all 
material contained in both sets of brackets. 
Variations from Official Text: 
Alaska. In subd. (a), substitutes "shall 
be" for "may be" and uses •'Administrative 
Procedure Act (A.S. 44.62)". 
Omits subd. (g). 
Omits subd. (g). 
South Carolina. In subd. (a), omits 
"adopted, amended, or repealed" and in-
serts bracketed material relating to public 
hearing and notice. 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=>863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
Notes of Decisions 
Appointment of monitors 2 
Jurisdiction 1 
1. Jurisdiction of court 
District Court of Appeal lacked jurisdic-
tion of proceeding on petition for review of 
Florida land sales board's order suspending 
private land corporation as registrant under 
board and appointing monitors to oversee 
land corporation's operations where pro-
ceeding, in effect, sought equitable relief 
available to stockholder in court of equity 
on issue whether officers had acted illegally 
in agreeing and pleading guilty, in effect, to 
board's order. Florik v. Florida Land Sales 
Bd., Fla.App.1967, 206 So.2d 41. 
2. Appointment of monitors 
Florida land sales board lacked authority 
to appoint monitors to oversee operation of 
land company and to expend sums ranging 
up to $150,000 for their expenses and sala-
ries to be taxed against corporation. Gulf 
Am. Corp. v. Florida Land Sales Bd., App., 
206 So.2d 457 (1968). 
Florida land sales board lacked authority 
to select monitors to oversee operation of 
private corporation for purpose of seeing 
that it complied with boards orders. Florik 
v. Florida Land Sales Bd., Fla.App.1967, 206 
So.2d 41. 
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§ 1 1 . [Investigations and Proceedings] 
(a) The agency may: 
(1) make necessary public or private investigations within or outside 
of this State to determine whether any person has violated or is about 
to violate this Act or any rule or order hereunder or to aid in the 
enforcement of this Act or in the prescribing of rules and forms 
hereunder; 
(2) require or permit any person to file a statement in writing, under 
oath or otherwise as the agency determines, as to all the facts and 
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 407, Uniform information concerning violations of 
Securities Act, except that the agency the Act 
is not expressly permitted to publish 
(b) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this Act, 
the agency or any officer designated by rule may administer oaths or 
affirmations, and upon its own motion or upon request of any party may 
subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require 
the production of any matter which is relevant to the investigation, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and loca-
tion of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, or any other 
matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material evi-
dence. 
COMMENT 
Copied in part from section 407(b), from Rule 26b, Federal Rules of Civil 
Uniform Securities Act, and in part Procedure. 
(c) Upon failure to obey a subpoena or to answer questions propound-
ed by the investigating officer and upon reasonable notice to all persons 
affected thereby, the agency may apply to [insert name of appropriate 
court] for an order compelling compliance. 
COMMENT 
Modeled after Rule 37a and 37b, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
[ (d) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under 
this Act shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.] 
692 
LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT §12 
COMMENT 
To be deleted if the agency already dure or if the state has no administra-
tes established special rules of proce- tive procedures act. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: In subd. (b), substitutes "the commission-
Alaska. In subd. (b), substitutes "the er" Jo* "rule" and "his or her own" for "its 
department or an officer designated by the own", 
department" for "the agency or any officer ~ .^  , ,
 /JX 
designated by rule". Omits subd. (d). 
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for South Carolina. In subd. (b), substitutes 
"agency", wherever appearing. "shall" for "may" preceding "subpoena". 
In subd. (a)(1), inserts "or regulation"
 0 m i t s s u b d <d) 
following "any rule" and "and regulations" 
following "of rules". 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=>863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 12 . [Cease and Desist Orders] 
(a) If the agency determines after notice and hearing that a person 
has: 
(1) violated any provision of this Act; 
(2) directly or through an agent or employee knowingly engaged in 
any false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, promotional, or sales 
methods to offer or dispose of an interest in subdivided lands; 
(3) made any substantial change in the plan of disposition and 
development of the subdivided lands subsequent to the order of 
registration without obtaining prior written approval from the agency; 
(4) disposed of any subdivided lands which have not been registered 
with the agency; or 
(5) violated any lawful order or rule of the agency; 
it may issue an order requiring the person to cease and desist from the 
unlawful practice and to take such affirmative action as in the judgment 
of the agency will carry out the purposes of this Act. 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 478.161, Florida 
Statutes. 
(b) If the agency makes a finding of fact in writing that the public 
interest will be irreparably harmed by delay in issuing an order, it may 
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issue a temporary cease and desist order. Prior to issuing the temporary 
cease and desist order, the agency whenever possible by telephone or 
otherwise shall give notice of the proposal to issue a temporary cease 
and desist order to the person. Every temporary cease and desist order 
shall include in its terms a provision that upon request a hearing will be 
held [promptly] [within days] to determine whether or not it 
becomes permanent. 
COMMENT 
Modeled upon proposed amended 
draft of Rule 65b, Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: In subd. (b), substitutes "the commission-
A1 T . „ er may" for "it ma/', and inserts "prompt-
Alaska. In subd. (b), inserts 10 days". y, ^
 l a s t sentence. 
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for South Carolina. In subd. (b), inserts 
"agency" wherever appearing. "promptly". 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=»863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 1 3 . [Revocation] 
(a) A registration may be revoked after notice and hearing upon a 
written finding of fact that the subdivider has: 
(1) failed to comply with the terms of a cease and desist order; 
(2) been convicted in any court subsequent to the filing of the 
application for registration of a crime involving fraud, deception, false 
pretenses, misrepresentation, false advertising, or dishonest dealing in 
real estate transactions; 
(3) disposed of, concealed, or diverted any funds or assets of any 
person so as to defeat the rights of subdivision purchasers; 
(4) failed faithfully to perform any stipulation or agreement made 
with the agency as an inducement to grant any registration, to 
reinstate any registration, or to approve any promotional plan or public 
offering statement; or 
(5) made intentional misrepresentations or concealed material facts 
in an application for registration. Findings of fact, if set forth in 
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit 
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings. 
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(b) If the agency finds after notice and hearing that the subdivider has 
been guilty of a violation for which revocation could be ordered, it may 
issue a cease and desist order instead. 
COMMENT 
Modeled after section 478.161, Flor- merely ultimate findings but are suffi-
ida Statutes, with the addition of the ciently explicit to afford an aggrieved 
language relating to findings of fact to
 p a rty relief upon judicial review, insure that findings of fact are not 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: In subd. (b), substitutes "the commission-
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for e r m a y" for "it may", 
"agency", wherever appearing. 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=*863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 14 . [Judicial Review] 
[ (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available 
within the agency and who is aggrieved by an order pertaining to 
registration, a cease and desist order, an order of revocation, or any 
other final decision of the agency is entitled to judicial review under this 
Act. This section does not limit utilization or the scope of judicial review 
available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo 
provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency 
action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency 
decision would not provide an adequate remedy. 
(b) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition in the 
[insert the name of appropriate court] within [30] days after [mailing 
notice of] the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, 
within [30] days after the decision thereon. Copies of the petition shall 
be served upon the agency and all parties of record. 
(c) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the 
agency decision. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may 
order, a stay upon appropriate terms. 
(d) Within [30] days after the service of the petition, or within further 
time allowed by the court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing 
court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceed-
ing under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings, 
the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipu-
late to limit the record may be taxed by the court for the additional cost. 
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The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to 
the record. 
(e) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court 
for leave to present additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there 
were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding before the 
agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before 
the agency upon conditions determined by the court. The agency may 
modify its findings and decision by reason of the additional evidence and 
shall file that evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions 
with the reviewing court. 
(f) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall 
be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure 
before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken 
in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and 
receive written briefs. 
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency 
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may 
affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further 
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(3) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(4) affected by other error of law; 
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record; or 
(6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.] 
[Proceedings for judicial review shall be in accordance with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.] 
COMMENT 
Copied from section 15, 1961 Model cedure act, the sentence in the last set 
State Administrative Procedure Act. of brackets should be used in lieu of 
If the state has an administrative pro- subsections (a) through (g). 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for 
. "agency", wherever appearing, and omits 
Alaska. Omits this section. reference to Administrative Procedure Act. 
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In subd. (g), introductory text, substitutes South Carolina. Omits reference to the 
"commissioner's findings"' for "administra- Administrative Procedure Act. 
tive findings". 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=>863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 15 . [Penalties] 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this Act or of a rule 
adopted under it or any person who" willfully, in an application for 
registration, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to 
state a material fact is guilty of a [misdemeanor] [felony] and may be 
fined not less than [$1,000] [$5,000] or double the amount of gain from 
the transaction, whichever is the larger but not more than [$50,000]; or 
he may be imprisoned for not more than [6 months] [2 years]; or both. 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of 
Alaska. Section reads: n o t l e s s tb3n $ 1>0 0 0 o r d o u b l e t h e a m o u n t 
of gain from the transaction, whichever is 
"(a) A person who wilfully violates § 6
 l a r g e r b u t n o t m o r e than $50,000, or by 
[§ 34.55.006 of the Alaska Act; set forth in imprisonment for not more than six months, 
General Statutory Notes of the Model Act]
 o r by both fine and imprisonment" 
or § 8 [§ 4 of the Model Act] of this chapter 
is, upon conviction, punishable by a fine of Kansas. Designates violation as felony, 
not more than $50,000, or by imprisonment provides for $1,000 as the minimum fine 
for not less than one year "nor more than a nd for 3 years as the maximum imprison-
five years, or by both fine and imprison- ment. 
m e n t
- South Carolina. Designates a violation 
"(b) Any violation of this chapter other as a misdemeanor, provides for $1,000 as 
than as provided in (a) of this section or of a the minimum fine and for 3 years as the 
regulation adopted under this chapter is a maximum imprisonment 
Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=»863. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
§ 16- [Civil Remedy] 
(a) Any person who disposes of subdivided lands in violation of section 
4, or who in disposing of subdivided lands makes an untrue statement of 
a material fact, or who in disposing of subdivided lands omits a material 
fact required to be stated in a registration statement or public offering 
statement or necessary to make the statements made not misleading, is 
liable as provided in this section to the purchaser unless in the case of an 
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untruth or omission it is proved that the purchaser knew of the untruth 
or omission or that the person offering or disposing of subdivided lands 
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known of the untruth or omission, or that the purchaser did not rely on 
the untruth or omission. 
COMMENT 
Modeled in part upon section 410(a), 2672, dated June 9, 1966 now pending 
Uniform Securities Actr and section 10 before the U.S. Senate, 
of the Committee Print Senate Bill 
(b) In addition to any other remedies, the purchaser, under subsection 
(a), of this section may recover the consideration paid for the lot, parcel, 
unit, or interest in subdivided lands together with interest at the rate of 
6% per year from the date of payment, property taxes paid, costs, and 
reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received from 
the subdivided lands, upon tender of appropriate instruments of recon-
veyance. If the purchaser no longer owns the lot, parcel, unit, or 
interest in subdivided lands, he may recover the amount that would be 
recoverable upon a tender of a reconveyance, less the value of the land 
when disposed of and less interest at the rate of 6% per year on that 
amount from the date of disposition. 
COMMENT 
Modeled upon section 410(a), Uni- tional. In those states the provision 
form Securities Act. In some states a for attorneys' fees should be deleted, 
statutory attorney fee is unconstitu-
(c) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a subdivider liable 
under subsection (a), every general partner, officer, or director of a 
subdivider, every person occupying a similar status or performing a 
similar function, every employee of the subdivider who materially aids in 
the disposition, and every agent who materially aids in the disposition is 
also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the 
subdivider, unless the person otherwise liable sustains the burden of 
proof that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the 
liability is alleged to exist. There is a right to contribution as in cases of 
contract among persons so liable. 
COMMENT 
Modeled upon section 10(a)(4), Sen-
ate Bill 2672, supra. 
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(d) Every person whose occupation gives authority to a statement 
which with his consent has been used in an application for registration or 
public offering statement, if he is not otherwise associated with the 
subdivision and development plan in a material way, is liable only for 
false statements and omissions in his statement and only if he fails to 
prove that he did not know and in the exercise of the reasonable care of 
a man in his occupation could not have known of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
(e) A tender of reconveyance may be made at any time before the 
entry of judgment. 
COMMENT 
(f) A person may not recover under this section in actions commenced 
more than 4 years after his first payment of money to the subdivider in 
the contested transaction. 
COMMENT 
(g) Any stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquir-
ing subdivided lands to waive compliance with this Act or any rule or 
order under it is void. 
COMMENT 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Modeled upon section 410(c), Uni-
form Securities Act. 
This limitation of action should be 
placed with the state's general law re-
lating to limitations. 
Modeled upon section 410(g), Uni-
form Securities Act 
Variations from Official Text: 
Alaska. Subd. (a) reads: "(a) A person 
who disposes of subdivided land in violation 
of § 6 [§ 34.55.006 of the Alaska Act, set 
forth in General Statutory Notes of the 
Model Act] or § 8 [§ 4 of the Model Act] of 
this chapter is liable as provided in this 
section to the purchaser unless in the case 
of an untruth or omission it is proved that 
the purchaser knew of the untruth or omis-
sion or that the person offering or disposing 
of subdivided land did not know and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known of the untruth or omission." 
Kansas. In subd. (b), the percentage rate 
at 15% in both instances. 
Makes minor language changes relating 
to gender without affecting substance. 
In subd. (g), inserts "or regulation" fol-
lowing "rule". 
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Library References 
Trade Regulation <s=>864. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Unfair Competition § 237. 
Notes of Decisions 
1 
Attorney's fees 11 
Construction with other laws 
Jury trial 9 
Knowledge of purchaser as. to untruth or 
omission 5 




Standard of care 3 
Statute of limitations 7 
Theory of case 10 
Transactions within act 2 
1. Construction with other laws 
Exemption from registration provisions 
of the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act provides exemption from 
registration requirements of Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act, but does not immunize 
sellers from liability under the UliSPA for 
fraud. State v. First Na t Bank of Anchor-
age, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
2. Transactions within act 
Actions of seller of land in lulling buyers 
into sense of security after the sales took 
place were not "transactions concerning 
land" for purposes of the Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act and liability for fraud 
could not be imposed on that basis; the 
language "transactions" should be con-
strued under the doctrine of ejusdem gener-
is as limited to transactions involving the 
transfer of an interest in land. State v. 
First Na t Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 
660 P.2d 406. 
3. Standard of care 
It would be illogical and unjust for the 
Supreme Court to devise a rule requiring 
subdividers operating before the Land Sales 
Practices Act became effective to be held to 
a more exacting standard of care than that 
imposed by the Act Stepanov v. Gavrilo-
vich, Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30. 
and who misrepresented those facts or 
omitted to mention those facts was properly 
ordered to provide restitution to those per-
sons who purchased their lots after effec-
tive date of amendments to the Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act making it applica-
ble to sales of instate land. State v. First 
- N a t Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 
P.2d 406. 
Liability of a subdivider for damages in-
curred by a purchaser of his lots because of 
the presence of permafrost depends on the 
failure of the subdivider to disclose permaf-
rost conditions that are known or could 
have been known through the exercise of 
reasonable care, that is, the use of appropri-
ate testing methods and review of available 
geologic data. Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 
Alaska 1979, 594 P.2d 30. 
5. Knowledge of purchaser as to untruth 
or omission 
Defense provided in statute governing 
civil remedies for violation of Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act requires actual knowl-
edge on part of purchaser as to untruth or 
omission on part of vendor; thus, failure of 
purchasers to investigate proffered real es-
tate and discover its actual condition was no 
defense to vendor's violation of statute in 
conveying real estate to purchasers. Wallis 
v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 632 P.2d 39. 
Even if vendor had defense that purchas-
er must exercise reasonable care to deter-
mine truthfulness of any material represen-
tation in order to avail themselves of sec-
tion of Uniform Land Sales Practices Act 
governing civil remedies for violations, 
where vendor disposed of property in viola-
tion of section of statute governing regis-
tration, public offerings, statement and re-
ceipts required for offer of interest in sub-
divided land, vendor was liable to purchas-
er. Id. 
6. Reliance 
4. Misrepresentation or omission of ma- Reliance is an essential element of cause 
terial facts of action under Uniform Land Sales Practic-
Seller who knew, prior to developing sub- es Law for subdivider's untrue statement of 
division, of facts relating to flood hazard material facts made in disposing of the in-
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terest in subdivided lands or in registration 
statement or public offering statement. 
Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding 
Club, Ltd., Fla.App.1981, 403 So.2d 1367. 
7. Statute of limitations 
Where none of three orange groves from 
which sales of lots were made to Canadian 
citizens was registered under Florida stat-
utes applying to sale of interests in subdi-
vided land, lot sellers were liable to pur-
chasers for such illegal sales, subject to any-
applicable statute of limitations which could 
stand in bar of individual class member's 
claim. Ferland v. Orange Groves of Flor-
ida, Inc., D.C.Fla.1974, 377 F.Supp. 690. 
8. Parties 
State must proceed under Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act in a representative ca-
pacity but certification as a class action is 
not a prerequisite to an award of restituto-
ry relief. State v. First Nat Bank of An-
chorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
State has the authority to bring suit in 
the public interest on the basis of common-
law fraud to obtain restitution for defraud-
ed land purchasers. State v. First Nat 
§ 17. [Jurisdiction] 
Modeled upon section 414(a), (b) and 
(c) of the Uniform Securities Act. 
Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 
406. 
9. Jury trial 
Where State sought only injunctive and 
restitutory relief under the Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act, developer was not enti-
tled to trial by jury. State v. First Nat 
Bank of Anchorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 
406. 
10. Theory of case 
Land seller's right to fair trial was jeop-
ardized when trial court adopted a new the-
ory of the case, common-law fraud, at the 
conclusion of the evidence in the case, 
which had been tried on the theory of viola-
tion of the Uniform Land Sales Practices 
Act State v. First Nat Bank of Anchor-
age, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
11. Attorney's fees 
Under section of Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act governing civil remedies for 
violation of statute purchaser may recover 
reasonable attorney fees not only for initial 
action but also for attorney fees incurred 
upon appeal. Wallis v. Thomas, Utah 1981, 
632 P.2d 39. 
Dispositions of subdivided lands are subject to this Act, and the [insert 
name of appropriate courts] of this State have jurisdiction in claims or 
causes of action arising under this Act, if: 
(1) the subdivided lands offered for disposition are located in this 
State; or 
(2) the subdivideds principal office is located in this State; or 
(3) any offer or disposition of subdivided lands is made in this State, 
whether or not the offeror or offeree is then present in this State, if 
the offer originates within this State or is directed by the offeror to a 
person or place in this State and received by the person or at the place 
to which it is directed. 
COMMENT 
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Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: 
Alaska. Section reads: "A disposition of 
subdivided land is subject to this chapter, 
and the superior court of this state has 
jurisdiction in claims or causes of action 
arising under this chapter if 
"(1) the subdivided s principal office is lo-
cated in this state; 
"(2) an offer or disposition of subdivided 
land is made in this state, whether or not 
the offeror or offeree is then present in this 
state, if the offer originates in this state or 
is directed by the offeror to a person or 
place in this state and received by the per-
son or at the place to which it is directed; 
or 
"(3) the subdivided land is located in this 
state." 
Kansas. Omits par. (1). 
South Carolina. Omits par. (1). 
Library References 
Consumer Protection <s=»36. 
Courts <s=>4. 
CJ.S. Courts §§ 6, 7, 37 et seq. 
CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names 
Unfair Competition §§ 237, 238. 
and 
Notes of Decisions 
Retroactive effect 1 
Rules and regulations 
1. Retroactive effect 
Amendment to Uniform Land Sales Prac-
tices Act making it applicable to in state's 
sales is not to be given retroactive applica-
tion. State v. First Nat Bank of Anchor-
age, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
2. Rules and regulations 
Regulations which had been adopted to 
implement the Uniform Land Sales Practic-
es Act prior to the time it was amended to 
apply to in-state land sales as well as out-of-
state land sales were required to be repro-
mulgated after the adoption of amendments 
to the Act making it applicable to in-state 
land sales; failure to repromulgate the reg-
ulations did not deprive developer of due 
process. State v. First Nat Bank of An-
chorage, Alaska 1982, 660 P.2d 406. 
§ 18 . [Interstate Rendition] 
In the proceedings for extradition of a person charged with a crime 
under this Act, it need not be shown that the person whose surrender is 
demanded has fled from justice or at the time of the commission of the 
crime was in the demanding or other state. 
Library References 
Extradition «s>34. 
CJ.S. Extradition § 13 et seq. 
§ 19 . [Service of Process] 
(a) In addition to the methods of service provided for in the [Rules of 
Civil Practice] service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to 
the office of the agency, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff (which 
may be the agency in a proceeding instituted by it) 
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(1) forthwith sends a copy of the process and of the pleading by 
[certified] [registered] mail to the defendant or respondent at his last 
known address, and 
(2) the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this section is filed in 
the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within 
such further time as the court allows. 
(b) If any person, including any nonresident of this State, engages in 
conduct prohibited by this Act or any rule or order hereunder, and has 
not filed a consent to service of process and personal jurisdiction over 
him cannot otherwise be obtained in this State, that conduct authorizes 
the agency to receive service of process in any noncriminal proceeding 
against him or his successor which grows out of the conduct and which is 
brought under this Act or any rule or order hereunder, with the same 
force and validity as if served on him personally. Notice shall be given 
as provided in subsection (a). 
COMMENT 
This section should be deleted if the to service of process. Modeled upon 
general statutes of the state provide a section 414 of the Uniform Securities 
method for service of process that Act and section 5(2) of the Uniform 
would be applicable to this Act If not, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
this section should be included m the x ^ 
chapter of the state statutes relating 
Action in Adopting Jurisdictions 
Variations from Official Text: In subd. (a)(1), inserts "certified, or reg-
Alaska. In subd. (a)(1), inserts "certi- istered". 
fied
''
 f In subd. (b), inserts "or regulation" fol-
Kansas. Substitutes "commissioner" for lowing "any rule" in both instances, 
"agency", wherever appearing and makes 
minor language changes relating to gender South Carolina. In subd. (a)(1), inserts 
without affecting substance. "certified or registered". 
Library References 
Consumer Protection <s»36. CJ.S. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and 
Process e=>49. Unfair Competition §§ 237, 238. 
CJ.S. Process § 25 et seq. 
§ 2 0 . [Uniformity of Interpretation] 
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
Library References 
Statutes <s=>226. 
CJ.S. Statutes § 371 et seq. 
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§ 2 1 . [Short Title] 
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 
§ 2 2 . [Severability] 
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provi-
sions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the 




C J.S. Statutes § 96 et seq. 
§ 23 . [Repeal] 






CJ.S. Statutes § 282. 
§ 24 . [Effective Date] 
This Act shall take effect [not less than 90 days after enactment]. 
Library References 
Statutes «=»255. CJ.S. Statutes §§ 405, 407. 
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State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Real Estate 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South/ Box 146711 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6711 ^ ^ - — " 
Phone (801) 530-6747 ~ ^ 
Fax (801) 530-6749 
Internet http://www.commerce.state.ut.u&^tj^ 
September 30, 1996 
MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS 
MARKET WISE INVESTORS INC 
CRESS AND JUNE FERRIERA 
615 NORTH LOWER SACRAMENTO RD 
LODI CA 95242 
Re: Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding 
Case Number RE96-09-05 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Attached is an Administrative Cease and Desist Order issued 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-13 (1993) prohibiting 
you from selling subdivided land in this State until such time as 
you register the land as required by the Utah Land Sales Practices 
Act. 
If you wish to contest this Cease and Desist Order, you have the 
right to a hearing before an administrative law judge at which time 
you will have the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond 
conduct a cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence as to 
whether you should be prohibited from selling subdivided land 
within this State without registering the land. 
The hearing will be conducted as a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
The presiding officer at the hearing will be J. Steven Eklund, 
Administrative Law Judge., Department of Commerce. If you have any 
questions on hearing procedures, he may be contacted at*Box 146701* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701. His telephone number is (801) 
530-6648. 
If you wish to request a hearing, you must do so in writing within 
ten days of your receipt of the Cease and Desist Order. Pending 
the hearing, the Cease and Desist Order remains in effect. If, at 
the hearing, a finding is made that there has been a violation, the 
Cease and Desist Order will be made permanent. If you fail to 
cease the act or practice, the Director of the Division of Real 
Estate may file suit against you in District Court to enjoin and 
restrain you from the act or practice. 
If you do not contest the Cease and Desist Order by requesting a 
hearing, the Cease and Desist Order will remain in effect. 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 




You may represent yourself or you are entitled to be represented by 
legal counsel at all times while this action is pending. If you 
will be represented by legal counsel, your counsel should file an 
Entry of appearance with the Division no later than the date of 
your request for a hearing. 
Sincerely, 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
Shelley K. Wismer 
STAFF LEGAL COUNSEL 
96-09-05.na 
BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, BY 
AND THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR, 
TED BOYER, 
Plaintiff, ORDER TO CEASE 
vs. AND DESIST 
MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS, CASE NO. RE96-09-05 
MARKET WISE INVESTORS, INC., 
CRESS FERRIERA, and JUNE FERRIERA, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Pursuant to investigation by the Utah Division of Real Estate 
of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah and upon receipt: 
of information therefrom, the Director of the Utah Division of Real 
Estate has reason to believe that the above-named Respondents have 
been, and are, engaging in acts constituting violation of the Utah 
Land Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-1, et 
sea. (1993), to wit: Selling lots in the Mineral Mountain Ranches 
Subdivision in Beaver County, Utah which are not registered with 
the Division of Real Estate under the provisions of the Utah Land 
Sales Practices Act and which are not exempt from registration. 
The Director concludes chat such acts constitute a threat tc 
the public welfare. It also appearing that it would be in the 
public interest to stop such acts, the following Order is issued 
pursuant to the provision of Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-13 
(1993) : 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Respondents and any 
officers, agents, servants, employees and those persons in active 
concert or participation with Respondents who receive actual notice 
of this Order by personal service or otherwise; now, 
CEASE AND DESIST from the acts of offering or selling 
subdivided lands in this State until such time as such interests 
are properly registered with the Division of Real Estate of the 
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah under the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 57-11-1, et sea. The acts prohibited 
include, but are not limited to, selling or offering for sale lots 
in the Mineral Mountain Ranchos Subdivision or any adjacent 
acreage. / 
Dated this CjU day of .TVJO^A 
UTAH DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing 
document upon Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc. 
and Cress Ferriera by mailing a copy thereof, properly addressed, 
with postage prepaid, to Cress Ferriera, 615 North Lower Sacramento 
Rd., Lodi, CA 95242. 




BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of : FINDINGS OF FACT 
Mineral Mountain Ranchos, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Market Wise Investors Inc., AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera Case No. RE96-09-05 
Appearances: 
Blaine R. Ferguson for the Division of Real Estate 
Cress Ferriera for Respondents 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
A February 24, 1997 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. 
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, 
evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters his 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and submits the following Recommended Order to the 
Division for its review and action: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent Cress Ferriera is the president of Market Wise Investors, Inc., a 
California corporation. Respondent June Ferriera is the secretary of that corporation. The 
Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision, consisting of 22 lots, is located in Beaver County, 
Utah. 
2. The Beaver County Planning Commission reviewed the preliminary plat of the 
subdivision on April 20, 1983. The June 15, 1983 Beaver County Planning Commission 
minutes reflect Mr. Ferriera met with the Board on that date to obtain approval of the 
subdivision. Mr. Ferriera thus proposed to give .45 acre feet of water with each lot and 
further proposed that any subsequent purchaser of a lot would sign an agreement to thus 
acquire a total of .73 acre feet of water prior to building on the lot. 
3. The Board recommended that Mr. Ferriera-as the subdivider-be required to 
furnish .73 acre feet of water for each lot and the size of the subdivision be reduced if there 
was insufficient water to supply that amount of water to each lot. The Planning Commission 
minutes further reflect Mr. Ferriera elected to resubmit a plat with 20 five acre parcels for 
subsequent review and approval by the Board. 
4. The Beaver County Planning Commission reviewed the revised plat on July 6, 
1983, which reflects 20 five acre parcels. The Commission accepted that plat as thus 
presented. The Beaver County Commission approved the proposed subdivision on July 7, 
1983. Existing Beaver County ordinances regulating the platting and recording of 
subdivisions required that the subdivision plan reflect approval by the Planning Commission 
of "the quantity and feasibility of providing culinary water to the subdivision". 
5. Chapters 2 and 3 of the just-referenced ordinances establish the requirements 
applicable to preliminary and final plats. Chapter 4-5(a) provides all subdivisions "shall have 
a supply of culinary water available to each lot in the subdivision." Subsection (b) also 
provides the quantity and method of distribution "shall be approved by the Commission." 
Subsection (c) further provides all buyers in the subdivision "shall be advised of specific 
points of connection or availability of water and the earliest time at which connection may be 
made or at what time water may be made available". 
6. Respondents had submitted an April 1983 feasibility study to Beaver County 
regarding the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision. The study recites that individual water 
wells "are anticipated as sources of supply for each lot". The study also references a 
statement from the Utah State Engineer "which discusses feasibility of obtaining ground 
water". The study also recites Respondent Cress Ferriera "plans to deed 0.45 acre-foot to 
each lot at the time they are purchased" as to "allow the drilling of a well with sufficient 
water rights for domestic purposes". 
7. The feasibility study includes a March 7, 1983 letter from Gerald W. Stoker, area 
engineer for the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy Water Rights Division. The 
letter reflects Respondent Cress Ferriera has drilled one \Vell on his property as to the 
proposed subdivision, but the Division of Water Rights "has not made a determination on the 
quality of the water developed". The letter further states it was anticipated "there would be 
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additional sites within the four section area mentioned that would have the potential for 
potable water but that opinion is speculatory". 
8. Respondent drilled a well on two lots in the subdivision during 1982 and 1983. 
Respondent drilled two more wells on different lots in the subdivision during 1993. Based 
on the substantial and credible evidence presented, the four existing wells have an aggregate 
pumping capacity sufficient to provide water to all lots in the subdivision. However, 
Respondents have not provided every lot with actual access to water available through 
existing wells on adjoining lots. 
9. The Division and Respondents agree and acknowledge that lots in the Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos subdivision are not, and never have been, registered with the Division 
pursuant to the Utah Land Sales Practices Act. On or about November 17, 1995, Market 
Wise Investors Inc. conveyed—by warranty deed—three lots in the Mineral Mountain Ranchos 
subdivision to Douglas W. Parker, John C. Fry and Dale A. Fry, and Steven J. Scandell, 
respectively. 
10. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented, no prospective 
purchaser of a lot in the subdivision would necessarily be able to share a well with an 
adjoining lot owner. However, access to water in that manner would avoid the expenses of 
drilling a separate well on each lot. The above-described warranty deeds recite that no 
"warranty is expressed or implied as to water quality or quantity". The deeds further recite 
that the owner of any lot agrees "that any use of water from the existing well is entirely at 
their own risk". 
11. The warranty deeds also provide Respondent Market Wise Investors, Inc. has 
reserved "the right to install and maintain additional pumping facilities in the well for their 
own exclusive use providing said pumping facilities do not curtail the availability of culinary 
water to owners of the aforementioned lots". Moreover, the just-described easement is given 
in lieu of "any and all obligations that might exist now or in the future" upon Respondents or 
their successors and assigns "in regards to providing water to any of the aforementioned 
lots". 
12. The Division issued a September 30, 1996 Cease and Desist Order, whereby 
Respondents Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and 
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June Ferriera were ordered to cease and desist from offering or selling lots in the Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos subdivision, any adjacent acreage or any other subdivided lands in Utah 
until such time as those lands are properly registered with the Division. The September 30, 
1996 Order further recites the lots in question are not exempt from registration and that the 
Order was entered because the sale of unregistered lots constitutes a threat to the public 
welfare. 
13. Respondent Cress Ferriera contacted this Court by telephone on October 11, 1996 
and thus timely preserved Respondents' right to subsequently request a hearing to formally 
contest the September 30, 1996 Order. Respondents submitted an application to register the 
lands in question, which was received by the Division on October 28, 1996. The Division 
has neither granted nor denied that application. Notwithstanding the submission of that 
application, Respondents have notified the Division that Respondents believe the subdivision 
is exempt from registration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision is exempt from 
registration under the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. Specifically, Respondents 
contend §57-1 l-4(l)(f) of that Act creates an exemption from registration which is applicable 
in this proceeding. 
The Division asserts no statutory exemption applies as to obviate the need for 
registration of the subdivision in question. Specifically, the Division urges Respondents have 
failed to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements for culinary water 
as to the lands under review. Accordingly, the Division contends none of those lands in 
question may be sold without being duly registered under the Act. 
U.C.A. §57-11-5 provides: 
Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt under §57-11-4, the 
following apply: 
(1) No person may offer or dispose of any interest in subdivided lands 
located in this state prior to the time the subdivided lands are registered in 
accordance with this chapter . . . . 
§57-11-4(1) provides the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act does not apply to offers or 
dispositions of an interest in land: 
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(f) if at the time of the offer or disposition the subdivider 
furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements 
described in Subsections (ii) and (iii) and the interest lies within the 
boundaries of a first, second or third class city or county which: 
(i) has a planning and zoning board utilizing or 
employing at least one professional planner; 
(ii) enacts ordinances which require approval of 
planning, zoning, and plats, including the approval of plans 
for streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control; 
and 
(iii) in which the interest in land will have the 
improvements described in Subsection (ii) plus telephone and 
electricity . . . 
The Division and Respondent have stipulated that the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision 
is located within the boundaries of Beaver County, that the county had a planning and zoning 
board utilizing or employing at least one professional planner, that the county had enacted 
ordinances requiring approval of planning, zoning and plats-which also included the approval 
of plans for culinary water—and that no dispute exists in this proceeding with respect to any 
improvements beyond those required as to culinary water. 
The above-quoted statute was enacted in 1991 and necessarily governs as of the time an 
offer or disposition is made by a subdivider with respect to the lands in question. Respondent 
urges the prior version of §57-ll-4(l)(f), effective when Beaver County approved the 
subdivision in 1983, is relevant and that statute-unlike the 1991 version-did not expressly 
require the subdivider to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements in 
question. 
The prior version of §57-11-4(1) provided that registration requirements of the Utah 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act did not apply to offers or dispositions of an interest in land: 
(f) Which at the time of the offer or disposition lies within the boundaries 
of a first, second or third class city or a county, which city or county has a 
planning and zoning board utilizing or employing at least one professional 
planner, and which interest in land is subject to ordinances which require 
approval of planning and zoning and plats, including the approval of plans 
for streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control, and which 
requires satisfactory assurance of completion of all of those improvements, 
and which interest in land will have all of those improvements plus telephone 
and electricity . . . (All emphasis herein added). 
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Concededly, the 1981 statute did not expressly impose a duty on the subdivider to provide 
satisfactory assurance of completion of all necessary improvements. Nevertheless, that 
statute clearly provides that the ordinances in question must require satisfactory assurance of 
completion of improvements. By necessary and reasonable implication, such assurance 
would be forthcoming from the subdivider. 
Despite the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes there is no operative difference 
between the above-quoted versions of §57-ll-4(l)(f). Specifically, the Court readily 
concludes both statutes required initial approval of plans for culinary water and that the 
subdivider would be required to provide satisfactory assurance of completion of those 
improvements at the time of any subsequent offer or disposition of an interest in the land in 
question. Clearly, the Beaver County Commission did not require Respondents to actually 
provide direct access to water on every lot prior to the approval of the subdivision in 1983. 
Moreover, the Commission merely required that a sufficient quantity of water be 
subsequently available to each lot owner and the Commission was necessarily satisfied that 
such a quantity existed when the subdivision was approved approximately fourteen years ago. 
The critical issue is what constitutes "completion of the improvements" as to culinary 
water with respect to the subdivision under review. The mere fact that Respondents could 
convey some interest in water rights to a prospective lot purchaser or that any prospective 
purchaser could enter an agreement with the owner of an adjacent lot to share a well and 
thus realize actual access to culinary water on the land in question cannot be reasonably 
construed to constitute the completion of improvements, as that phrase is used in §57-11-
4(l)(f). 
Respondents may well have satisfied the Beaver County Commission as to the potential 
availability of water for the lands in question to thus prompt approval of the platted 
subdivision. However, §57-ll-4(l)(f) requires a subsequent assurance by the subdivider of 
the completion of improvements as to culinary water when an offer or disposition of the 
interest in the land is made. Clearly, the improvements in question must necessarily consist 
of either the construction of a well on each lot to actually provide culinary water for that lot 
or the completion of a delivery system whereby water from an adjoining lot is available to 
the lot in question. Since Respondents concede water is not actually available on each lot in 
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the subdivision at the present time, the Court finds and concludes Respondents have not 
provided assurance of the completions of improvements as to culinary water to thus qualify 
for an exemption from registration under §57-ll-4(l)(f). 
The Division also urges Respondents must apply for an exemption under §57-11-4(3). 
That statute provides as follows: 
(a) Notwithstanding the exemptions in Subsections (1) and (2), any person 
making an offer or disposition of an interest in land which is located in Utah 
shall apply to the Division for an exemption before the offer or disposition is 
made if: 
(i) the person is representing, in connection with the offer or 
disposition, the availability of culinary water service to or on the 
subdivided land; and 
(ii) the culinary water service is provided by a water corporation as 
defined in §54-2-1. 
Respondents have generally represented to prospective purchasers that water is available in 
the subdivision. However, there is a lack of substantial and credible evidence that 
Respondents have represented that culinary water service is available to each lot in the 
subdivision. Significantly, no evidence was presented in this proceeding that any culinary 
water service is provided by any water corporation as defined in §54-2-1. Thus, §57-11-
4(3)(a)(ii) does not apply and Respondents are not statutorily bound to file any request with 
the Division for an exemption under §57-11-4(3). 
A procedural issue should also be addressed. During the February 24, 1997 hearing, 
Respondents asserted the September 30, 1996 Order was invalid as having been prematurely 
issued without the opportunity for a hearing or the submission of any information by 
Respondents to the Division as to possibly resolve any concerns prior to the issuance of the 
Order. The Court duly notes §57-11-13, which provides: 
(l)(a) If the director has reason to believe that any person has been or is 
engaging in conduct violating this chapter . . . he shall issue and serve upon the 
person a cease and desist order and may also order the person to take such 
affirmative actions as the director determines will carry out the purposes of this 
chapter. 
(b) The person served may request an adjudicative proceeding within ten 
days after receiving the order. 
(c) The cease and desist order remains in effect pending the hearing. 
(d) The division shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
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Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, if the person served requests a 
hearing. 
Significantly, §57-11-13(2) further provides: 
(a) After the hearing the director may issue an order making the cease and 
desist order permanent if the director finds there has been a violation of this 
chapter. 
The just-quoted statute clearly authorizes the director to issue a cease and desist order 
prior to conducting any hearing on the issues which prompt the issuance of that order. As a 
corollary, the statute duly provides any person to whom a cease and desist order is directed 
may request a hearing to challenge the validity of that order. Given Respondents' belief that 
the lands in question are exempt from registration under the Act, they requested that a 
hearing be conducted in this proceeding. The hearing was timely conducted and Respondents 
were thus afforded all due process required by statute in that regard. 
During the February 24, 1997 hearing, Respondents requested the opportunity to 
subsequently challenge the validity of the September 30, 1996 Order on the basis that the 
Order had been improperly issued without a prior hearing. The Court thus granted 
Respondents leave to raise that issue following the issuance of any order as to whether the 
lands under review are exempt from registration under the Act. This Court remains 
convinced that the September 30, 1996 Order was issued in full compliance with the 
procedural requirements mandated by §57-11-13. Nevertheless, the Court will address any 
request filed by Respondents to challenge the validity of that Order if Respondents file a 
written objection in that regard no later than thirty (30) days from the date the Recommended 
Order set forth below may be adopted by the Division. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the September 30, 1996 Order shall become 
permanent, effective the date this Recommended Order is adopted by the Division. 
Specifically, the Mineral Mountain Ranchos subdivision is not exempt from registration 
under Utah law. Accordingly, no offer of an interest in those lands or any disposition of an 
interest in those lands may be made until such time as the lands are duly registered with the 
Division. 
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I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order were submitted to Ted Boyer, Director of the Division of Real Estate, 
on the 3&*^ day of June, 1997 for his review and action. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SSRVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing 
Order and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended 
Order to: 
Cress Ferriera 
615 N Lower Sacramento Rd. 
Lodi, CA 95242 
and hand-delivered a copy to: 
Blaine R. Ferguson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Dated this ^j day of June, 1997. 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of 
Mineral Mountain Ranchos, 
Market Wise Investors Inc., 
Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera 
ORDER 
Case No. RE96-09-05 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are 
hereby adopted. / 
Dated this *-{ day of June, 1997. 
Wf^ Ted Boyer, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review 
with the Executive Director, Department of Commerce within thirty (30) days after the date 
of this order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in §63-46b-12 of the 
Utah Code and §R151~46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
MINERAL MOUNTAIN RANCHOS, 
MARKET WISE INVESTORS, INC., 
CRESS FERRIERA and 
JUNE FERRIERA 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request of the Petitioners, 
Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and June Ferriera 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Petitioner"), for agency review of the Order heretofore 
entered by the Division of Real Estate (hereafter "Division"). 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether Mineral Mountain Ranchos is exempt from registration under the 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act (also referred to hereafter as "Act"). 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Case No. RE96-09-05 
I 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 30, 1997 the Division issued an Order to Cease and Desist 
requiring Petitioner to cease and desist from the offer and sale of subdivided land in the State of 
Utah until properly registered with the Division pursuant to the Uniform Land Sales Practices 
Act. This order was signed for by Petitioner on October 4, 1996. 
2. The Order to Cease and Desist was attached to a Notice of Formal Adjudicative 
Proceeding informing Petitioner of the right to contest the cease and desist order and request a 
hearing to be conducted as a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
3. Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review arguing that Mineral Mountain 
Ranchos is exempt from the Act and that the Division's cease and desist procedure was violative 
of due process. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
,1. The cease and desist order which was entered against Petitioner in this matter on 
September 30, 1996 was entered under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-13 which 
provides, inter alia: 
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person has 
been or is engaging in conduct violating this chapter, or has 
violated any lawful order or rule of the division, he shall issue and 
serve upon the person a cease and desist order and may also order 
the person to take such affirmative actions the director determines 
will carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
(b) The person served may request an adjudicative proceeding 
within ten days after receiving the order. 
(c) The cease and desist order remains in effect pending the 
hearing. 
(d) The division shall follow the procedures and requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, if the 
person served requests a hearing. 
2. The cease and desist order prohibited Petitioner from " . . . offering or selling 
subdivided lands in this State until such time as such interests are properly registered with the 
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Division 
3. The Executive Director is of the opinion that Petitioner's arguments concerning 
the legitimacy of the Order to Cease and Desist are actually non-issues since the order would be 
of no force or effect if the subject property is exempt from registration under the Act by operation 
of law or, in the alternative, the property is determined to be entitled to exemption or becomes 
registered under the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 
4. The applicable law governing the disposition of any interests in subdivided 
property in the State of Utah is the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act which provides in UTAH 
CODE ANN. §57-11-5, in part: 
Unless the subdivided lands or the transaction is exempt 
under Section 57-11-4, all of the following apply: 
(1) No person may offer or dispose of any interest in 
subdivided lands located in this state nor offer or dispose in this 
state of any interest in subdivided lands located outside of this state 
prior to the time the subdivided lands are registered in accordance 
with this chapter. 
5. The threshold issue in this case is whether the subject property falls within the 
purview of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-4(1) provides that: 
[ujnless the method of disposition is adopted for the 
purpose of evasion of this chapter or the federal act, this chapter 
does not apply to offers or dispositions of an interest in land: 
(f) if at the time of the offer or disposition the subdivider 
furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of the improvements 
described in Subsections (ii) and (iii) and the interest lies within 
the boundaries of a first, second, or third class city or a county 
which: 
(i) has a planning and zoning board utilizing or 
employing at least one professional planner; 
(ii) enacts ordinances that require approval of 
planning, zoning, and plats, including the approval of plans for 
streets, culinary water, sanitary sewer, and flood control; and 
(iii) in which the interest in land will have the 
improvements described in Subsection (ii) plus telephone and 
electricity; 
6. Property which is not automatically exempt as being outside of the auspices of the 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act may seek exemption of a commercial subdivision under the 
provisions of §57-11-4(3): 
(a) Notwithstanding the exemptions in Subsections (1) and 
(2), any person making an offer or disposition of an interest in land 
which is located in Utah shall apply to the division for an 
exemption before the offer or disposition is made if: 
(i) the person is representing, in connection with the 
offer or disposition, the availability of culinary water service to or 
on the subdivided land; and 
(ii) the culinary water service is provided by a water 
corporation as defined in Section 54-2-1. 
(b) A subdivider seeking to qualify under this exemption 
shall file with the division an application for exemption together 
with a filing fee of $50 and an application containing: 
(i) information required by the division to show that 
the offer or disposition is exempt under the provisions of this 
section; 
(ii) a statement as to what entity will be providing 
culinary water service and the nature of that entity; and 
(iii) a copy of the entity's certificate of convenience 
and necessity issued by the Public Service Commission, or 
evidence that the entity providing water service is exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. 
7. The first question is whether Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls outside of the 
provisions of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. If the Act does not apply to Petitioner then 
the Division was in error in attempting to force Petitioner to seek registration, and the decision in 
favor of the Division would have to be reversed and the order requiring registration would 
have to be dismissed and held for naught. However, the Executive Director does not reach the 
conclusion that Mineral Mountain Ranchos is entitled to exemption as being excluded from the 
Act.. 
8. The only real dispute in this matter between Petitioner and the Division revolves 
around the issue of culinary water at Mineral Mountain Ranchos and the furnishing of the same 
to the lots in the subdivision. The applicable exclusionary test set forth under the Act in UTAH 
CODE ANN. §57-11-4(1 )(f) is that if, at the time of offer or disposition of the subdivided land, the 
city or county in which the subdivision is located requires approval of plans for culinary water 
and the subdivider furnishes satisfactory assurance of completion of such culinary water 
improvements then the subdivision is excluded from the Act. 
9. Petitioner argues that the 1981 version of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act 
rather than the current enactment should apply to Mineral Mountain Ranchos since it was 
subdivided under the prior enactment of the law. The Executive Director has examined the 
current law and finds no language indicating that existing subdivisions were intended to be 
grandfathered under it and Petitioner offers no compelling argument to the point that the 
legislature intended to exclude from the Act unsold lots in existing subdivisions. 
10. The subdivision ordinance in effect in Beaver County in 1983 when Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos was approved required that the proposed subdivision plan show the 
"[ajpproval of the planning commission approving the quantity and feasibility of providing 
culinary water to the subdivision" [§2-l-3(g)j. The ordinance further provided in §4-1-5 that: 
a. All subdivisions shall have a supply of culinary water 
available to each lot in the subdivision 
b. Quantity and method of distribution shall be approved 
by the Commission. 
c. All buyers in the subdivision shall be advised of specific 
points of connection or availability of water and the earliest time at 
which connection may be made or at what time water may be made 
available.. . . (Emphasis added). 
11. The June 15 1983 minutes of the Beaver County Planning Commission reflect that 
Petitioner met with them seeking approval of Mineral Mountain Ranchos and proposed giving 
.45 acre feet of water with each lot. The commission rejected Petitioner's proposal and required 
Petitioner " . . . to furnish the .73 acrea (sic) ft. of water. It was recemmended (sic) that if 
[Petitioner] did not have the Water to supply the whole Subdivision he should cut the 
Subdivision down in the amount of Parcels so he could furnish the water." (Emphasis added). 
The planning commission voted to accept the subdivision ". . . with twenty, five acrea (sic) 
parcels with .73 acrea (sic) feet of water with.each lot." (Emphasis added). 
12. The Mineral Mountain Ranchos plat shows that the plat was filed on July 8, 1983. 
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The plat contains the approval of the planning commission dated July 6, 1983. The record offers 
substantial evidence to support a finding that Petitioner obtained approval of the Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos by the planning commission based upon representations that culinary water 
would be provided by Petitioner at each lot in the subdivision although Petitioner would argue to 
the contrary. The Court of Appeals in Albertsons v. Dept. Of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1993) states the standard for resolving conflicting evidence on a record review: 
We defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting evidence. 
We are in no position to second guess the detailed findings of the 
ALJ which were adopted by the Board. It is not our role to judge 
the relative credibility of witnesses. "In undertaking such a review, 
this court will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a 
different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo 
review." (Citation omitted). "It is the province of the Board, not 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, 
it is for the Board to draw the inferences. (Emphasis added). 
13. The record reflects that on June 13, 1996 Petitioner filed for record with the 
Beaver County Recorder an amendment to the subdivisions covenants and restrictions providing 
that Petitioner ". . . assumes no responsibility for quantity and quality of well water." This would 
be in direct contravention of the agreement made by Petitioner to obtain planning commission 
approval of the subdivision in which culinary water was to be furnished to the lots, and would 
further be violative of the county ordinance. Such an action belies Petitioner's stated reliance 
upon having been approved under the Beaver County ordinances. If the intent of such ordinances 
can so easily be vitiated by subdivides, such action establishes and reinforces the need for 
registration under the Act and oversight by the Division of compliance for the protection of the 
public. 
14. Petitioner is mistaken in a number of his assertions regarding agency review. 
Agency review is a record review governed by the same standards and rules as those applicable 
to judicial appellate review. UTAH ADMIN R151-46b-12(7) establishes the standards of agency 
review as corresponding to those established by UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-16(4) which provide, 
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among other things, that "[t]he appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following:.. ." after which follows a specific shopping list of reasons 
why relief might be granted to the party appealing the adverse action. Among the grounds 
potentially applicable in this case are: that the agency acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction; that 
the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law; that the decision is based upon findings not 
supported by any substantial evidence in the whole record. 
15. Although the Executive Director is required by UTAH CODE ANN.§63-46b-
16(4)(g) to review the "whole record" and the facts both supporting and detracting from the 
findings to determine whether the action of the Division is "supported by substantial evidence", 
the burden and responsibility remains upon the party challenging the facts to marshal all of the 
supporting facts in favor of the decision and show that despite such facts the decision is not 
supported by substantial evidence. First Nat 7 Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P. 2d 
1163 (Utah 1990). The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the appellate court to accept 
the findings of fact made by the inferior tribunal as conclusive. Crapo v. Industrial Comm 'n et 
al, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1996). 
16. The onerous burden undertaken by an appellant seeking to dispute the facts as 
found by the inferior tribunal is spelled out in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Whse., 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994): 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings 
lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants 
must bear when challenging factual findings. To successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play 
the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. 
In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty. . . , the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." (citations 
omitted). One appellants have established every pillar supporting 
their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial 
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court's findings, (citation omitted). They must show the trial 
court's findings are 'so lacking in support as to be "against the 
clear weight of the evidence," thus making them "clearly 
erroneous." (citations omitted). 
17. Petitioner is likewise inadequately familiar with the law and rules governing 
agency review in asserting UTAH ADMIN. R151-46b-5(3) for the proposition that case law is not 
controlling authority over decisions made by the Executive Director. The statement made by the 
rule is that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law discussing and interpreting such 
rules ("thereunder") are not controlling. The reason for this is that agency review is controlled 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
UCRP rules and interpretive case law are persuasive or advisory only. 
18. Petitioner is correct in stating that UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-16(4) sets out the 
grounds upon which relief may be granted rather than being a standard of review. "[SJection 64-
46b-16(4) deals with judicial relief, not judicial review. It is clear from this language that this 
section does not affect the degree of deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision." 
Morton Int'l Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm >?, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). The Morton case is 
also perhaps the best case explaining the three standards of review: 
a. Findings of fact made by an agency are entitled to the greatest deference and will not 
be disturbed if supported by any substantial evidence; 
b. An intermediate standard of review exists concerning the application of facts to the 
legal rules governing a case by an agency and grants some deference to the agency's experience 
and expertise in such determination with the test being that of reasonableness; and 
c. A correction-of-error standard applies to an agency's interpretation of law or issues 
characterized as concerning general law, and the appellate court grants no deference whatsoever 
to the agency on such issues. 
19. Although Petitioner seeks to argue with the findings of fact made by the 
Administrative Law Judge, Petitioner is not entitled to do so for failure to marshal the evidence. 
However there does not appear to be any dispute as to the ultimate fact: that Petitioner has at no 
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time been registered with the Division pursuant to the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. The 
issue before the Executive Director is therefore narrowed to either the second or third standard of 
review in which either intermediate deference or no deference is to be granted to the decision 
rendered by the Division. The Executive Director is of the opinion that the determination in this 
review rests solely upon interpretation of the applicable law since the law either applies or does 
not apply to Petitioner and, if it applies, Petitioner is either exempt or not exempt from the 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 
20. Petitioner attempts to argue in his briefs that the term "culinary water" does not 
equate to "potable water", a position which is not sustained by a search of Utah case law and 
references to water found elsewhere in the Utah Code Annotated of 1953. In such sources four 
types of water merit mention: culinary, domestic, irrigation and industrial. In the few instances 
where "potable" appears it is used in conjunction with "culinary" as a synonym. Therefore the 
Executive Director is of the opinion that "culinary water" as used in the applicable statutes and 
the Beaver County Subdivision Ordinance refers to water suitable for drinking. 
21. Mineral Mountain Ranchos was approved as a subdivision in 1983 under the 
representation that Petitioner would "furnish" .73 acre feet of culinary water to each lot in the 
subdivision. The Uniform Land Sales Practices Act applies to subdivisions unless the subdivider 
provides satisfactory assurance of completion of culinary water improvements at the time the lots 
are offered or transferred. In this case Petitioner agreed to supply culinary water to the lots in 
1983 but had not yet done so in 1996 and, according to the amended covenants, has no intention 
of so doing despite the assurances given to the planning commission in 1983 which resulted in 
the approval of the subdivision. The Executive Director is of the opinion and finds that Mineral 
Mountain Ranchos falls within the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and is required to either be 
registered or be determined by the Division to be exempt from the registration requirements. 
22. The exemption provisions of Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, UTAH CODE 
ANN. §57-1 l-4(3)(a), allows a subdivider to apply to the Division for an exemption before 
offering or disposing of property if a culinary water service provided by water system for public 
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service is represented as being available at the property. There is nothing whatsoever in the 
record to indicate any claim by Petitioner that culinary water offered by a water corporation is 
being represented as available to potential lot purchasers at Mineral Mountain Ranchos. The 
Executive Director is therefore of the opinion and finds Petitioner is not entitled to exemption 
from registration under the applicable provisions of the Act. 
23. Since the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls within the 
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act but is not exempt, Petitioner must therefore register the 
subdivision pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-5 prior to making an offer or disposition of 
any interest in the property comprising the subdivision. 
24. Petitioner alleged at the hearing below an inability at that time to proceed forward 
upon Petitioner's claim of having been denied due process under the cease and desist procedures 
followed by the Division pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-13. At the time of the hearing 
below, Petitioner was afforded an additional thirty days within which to develop and present his 
arguments on this issue to the Administrative Law Judge. Petitioner failed to do so and by such 
failure waived his objections did not preserve a right to have the issue considered on appeal. 
ORDER 
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce is of the opinion and finds: 
1. The subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos falls foursquare within the 
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-1 etseq.; 
2. The subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos is not entitled ... ar, 
exemption pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1 l-4(3)(a); and 
3. Petitioner is prohibited by the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §57-11-5 from 
offering or disposing of any interest in the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos 
until such time as registration is granted by the Division or a temporary permit is issued to 
Petitioner by the Division. 
And the Executive Director so finding, it is, therefore 
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ORDERED that the determination of the Division of Real Estate that the subdivision 
known as Mineral Mountain Ranchos must be registered is hereby affirmed and the order 
prohibiting Mineral Mountain Ranchos, Market Wise Investors, Inc., Cress Ferriera and June 
Ferriera from offering or disposing of any interest in the subdivision known as Mineral Mountain 
Ranchos is likewise affirmed in its entirety until such time as the subdivision is properly 
registered with the Division or a temporary permit is issued by the Division of Real Estate. 
SO ORDERED this the / — day of December, 1997. 
DOUCXAS C. BORB J JLA K Executive Director 
Utah JDepartment of CoWnerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the X v d a y of December, 1997, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review by certified mail, properly addressed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Mineral Mountain Ranchos 
Market Wise Investors, Inc. 
Cress Ferriera 
June Ferriera 
615 N. Lower Sacramento Road 
Lodi CA 95242 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Craig Jackson, Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel 
Utah Department of Commerce 
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